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Employment Discrimination Claims
Remain Valid Despite After-Acquired
Evidence of Employee Wrongdoing
Christine Neylon O'Brien*
A division among the federal circuits arose concerning the impact of
after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing upon an employer's
liability for statutory employment discrimination. When pre-trial
discovery unveiled a separate nondiscriminatory reason for termina-
tion, numerous circuits allowed such previously unknown informa-
tion to constitute a legitimate basis for the employment decision, fol-
lowing the model of a mixed-motive discharge. A trend developed
among several other circuits that after-acquired evidence of employee
misconduct should not prevent the establishment of employer liability,
but should be considered when addressing the remedy. The United
States Supreme Court recently affirmed the latter approach in
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
"So absolutely good is truth, truth never hurts the teller."
Robert Browning
Fifine at the Fair (1872), st. 32
I. INTRODUCTION
In what has been touted as the most closely watched labor case on the
Supreme Court's 1994 docket,' McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publish-
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Professor O'Brien served as Professor of Law at Bentley College, and as Visiting Pro-
fessor of Business Law and also Associate Dean of the Carroll School of Manage-
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a joint degree candidate at the Carroll School of Management and Boston College
Law School. She dedicates this Article to her mother, Mary Webb Neylon.
1. First Monday in October Shows Shrunken Supreme Court Case Load, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at C-i to C-2 (Sept. 28, 1994).
ing Co.,' Christine McKennon, a former secretary at the defendant news-
paper, the Nashville Banner, filed a lawsuit alleging that her employment
termination at age sixty-two constituted age discrimination.3 Mrs.
McKennon's performance evaluations were consistently excellent during
her thirty-nine years with the newspaper.4 She served as a secretary to
six different individuals over the course of her employment with the
defendant, having recently worked for Jack Gunther, Executive Vice
President, for over seven years when, in March 1989, Mr. Gunther's job
assignment changed.5 Thereafter, the newspaper relocated Mrs.
McKennon to the position of secretary to the Comptroller, Ms. Imogene
Stoneking.' The newspaper discharged Mrs. McKennon on October 31,
1990 and she filed suit in May 1991.'
Within the normal discovery process, Mrs. McKennon was deposed on
December 18, 1991, at which time the newspaper learned that she had
copied several confidential documents that she had access to during her
final position at the company.8 Mrs. McKennon took these items home
where she showed them to her husband, ostensibly to insure and protect
herself "in an attempt to learn information regarding [her] job security
concerns."5
2. 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994), rev'd and
remanded, 115 S. CL 879 (1995).
3. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540. Plaintiff averred violations of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V), and the correla-
tive state statute, the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
21-101 to 806 (1991 & Supp. 1994). McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797
F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). Because the district
court and Sixth Circuit refer to the plaintiff as Mrs. McKennon, this same mode of
reference is used herein to discuss the opinions from these courts.
4. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540.
5. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 605.
6. Id. Since a secretary's status and position are often tied to that of her/his su-
pervisor, it is noteworthy that the reassignment of Mrs. McKennon from secretary to
an executive vice president to secretary to a comptroller in all likelihood was a de-
motion of sorts, one that seemingly was not based upon poor work performance. See
id.; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 605.
8. Id. at 605-06. These included a payroll ledger and a profit/loss statement Id. at
605.
9. Id. at 606. The plaintiff obviously sought her husband's counsel about her em-
ployment situation. This is not so unusual in light of her regressed situation at the
newspaper. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In addition, Mrs. McKennon
was required to sign an acknowledgment of receipt of an employee handbook, dated
February 28, 1990, which was subsequently appended to the newspaper's memoran-
dum in support of its successful motion for summary judgment. McKennon, 797 F.
Supp. at 605. Unlike other precedent cited with approval by the Sixth Circuit in sup-
port of its affirmance of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the facts in
the McKennon case involved a sharing of information between husband and wife, a
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Ironically, Mrs. McKennon's conduct, which she attributed to caution,
coupled with her honest admission to these acts, operated to bar recov-
ery on her age discrimination complaint at the federal district court and
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.'" The newspaper issued her a "termi-
nation letter" just two days after the deposition was taken establishing
that she had copied the documents-this despite the fact that she had
been effectively discharged nine months earlier."
While there are many legal issues present in the McKennon case, the
primary issue of interest here is whether evidence acquired after employ-
ment termination should constitute a complete bar to a former
employee's age (or other statutorily protected characteristic) discrimi-
nation complaint, or whether such after-acquired evidence should merely
alter the remedy. May an employer's showing that it discovered another
basis for dismissal (other than age or another protected characteristic), a
basis of which it had no knowledge at the time when the decision to
terminate was made, operate to preclude the plaintiff from proceeding
with her claim? Should such after-acquired information bar liability for
the defendant employer? 2 Will after-acquired evidence prevent discrimi-
privileged communication that wrought no real injury or damaging publication upon
the defendant. Id.; cf. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466,
1467-70 (D. Ariz. 1992) (involving employee's removal of confidential management files
from supervisor's desk, photocopying, and showing them to a co-worker where court
upheld summary judgment, for employer based upon the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine.).
10. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 608; McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
9 F.3d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 1993). A very important public policy is served when the
law encourages parties and witnesses to tell the truth.
11. McKennon, 797 F. Supp at 605-06. It is likely that the employer's letter of
termination amounted to the defendant's attempt to cut off any potential back pay
liability as of the date when the after-acquired evidence became known. But see
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct
1397 (1995) (remanding to Third Circuit in light of McKennon). The Third Circuit had
provided guidance that backpay should not be cut off at the moment the employer
obtains the after-acquired evidence, rather a backpay award should be awarded up to
the date of judgment unless the defendant establishes it would have discovered the
after-acquired evidence anyway, absent the litigation. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1238-40; see
infra notes 319-57 and accompanying text; see also Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968
F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992) (rejecting an alternative approach that would end the
backpay period on the day the after-acquired evidence is learned during the litiga-
tion), vacated and reh'g granted, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994), offd in part and
rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995); infra notes 280-300 and accompanying
text.
12. See iUnda Greenhouse, Justices Appear to Favor Employees on a Job-Discrimi-
nation claims from ever "see[ing] the light of day," as Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg reflected during oral arguments in the McKennon case?3
This article analyzes the Supreme Court's McKennon decision and
evaluates the previous disposition of the federal courts on the weight of
after-acquired evidence in employment discrimination cases in light of
the liability and remedial treatments afforded in McKennon. As will be
discussed, the McKennon opinion in a straight forward manner clarifies
the liability issue,'4 but falls short of delineating the remedial ramifica-
tions in a manner that would fully restore the plaintiff to the position
that she/he would have been in absent the defendant's discrimination.5
Thus, a discussion of projected interpretations of McKennon's limited
guidance on remedies is in order.'6 Recommendations as to how the
federal courts should now deal with after-acquired evidence in employ-
ment discrimination cases, based upon the egregiousness of the viola-
tions of the parties and the importance of the public policy and private
interests involved, are set forth. 7
The following survey of cases from the federal courts outlines the legal
issues and the context within which after-acquired evidence developed
into a serious threat to plaintiffs in employment discrimination litigation.
The McKennon decision is discussed first, including its resolution by the
Supreme Court. Thereafter, other relevant precedent from the Sixth Cir-
cuit is examined. 8 The Supreme Court also granted certiorari on anoth-
er Sixth Circuit after-acquired evidence employment discrimination case
nation Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A22 (discussing oral arguments in
McKennon case and reporter's interpretation that Supreme Court Justices disapprove
of employers escaping liability for discrimination by unearthing after-the-fact evidence
that employee otherwise deserved dismissal); Justices Debate After-Acquired Evidence
as Device to Defeat Job Bias Liability Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at AA-1 to
AA-3 (Nov. 3., 1994) [hereinafter Justices Debate] (summarizing issues discussed at
Supreme Court oral arguments in McKennon).
13. See Court Hears Case of Justified Firing After a Bias Suit, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 3, 1994, at 8. This result reflects upon the grant of summary judgment for em-
ployers prior to the development of the employment discrimination claim pursuant to
the rule in the Sixth and other circuits that permit a "short-circuit" based upon after-
acquired evidence. See also Justices Debate, supra note 12 at AA-3. (discussing
plaintiffs loss of day in court); Robert J. Gregory, The Use of After-Acquired Evi-
dence in Employment Discrimination Cases: Should the Guilty Employer Go Free? 9
LAB. LAW. 43, 63 (1993) (criticizing Summers rationale that allows jettison of
plaintiffs case by summary judgment). The Supreme Court in McKennon ultimately
answered Justice Ginsburg's query in the negative. See infra notes 74-113 and accom-
panying text.
14. See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 379-422 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 423-28 and accompanying text
18. See infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text
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last year, but the certiorari was voluntarily dismissed because the parties
settled the case.9 The cases illustrate the many competing interests and
the legal and business issues involved in resolving these cases.
The approaches approved within the other federal circuits are then
discussed, beginning with the Tenth Circuit because of its paramount
role in the ascendance of the after-acquired evidence doctrine." Correla-
tive situations under the National Labor Relations Act are also consid-
ered within the analysis and discussion.2' The remedies afforded in
equal employment discrimination cases under federal precedent are also
compared to a recent common law decision from the State of Connecti-
cut regarding after-acquired evidence in a wrongful termination case.'
This case is instructive in that it provides a unique treatment of the bur-
den of proof on damages.' The article concludes with recommendations
for remedies beyond the brief guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court
in McKennon.
II. THE SIXTH CmcUrr CONVEYS THE QUESTION OF
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
TO THE SUPREME COURT
"Old age: the crown of life, our play's last act"
Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Senectute XXII
A. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
19. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993).
20. See infra notes 54-91 and accompanying text
21. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Misconduct Discovered
After an Employees' (sic] Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24
SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 1, 3-16 (1990), for an excellent discussion of the after the fact
defense under the NLRA. See also infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text discuss-
ing ABF Freight Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct. 835 (1994).
22. See infra notes 392-403 and accompanying text.
23. Preston v. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., 647 A.2d 364 (Conn. App. 1994)
(discussing evidentiary value of after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct, ap-
propriate jury instructions upon remand, and placing burden of proving that he would
have remained employed after discovery of the misconduct upon plaintiff as part of
his proof of damages of future lost pay). See infra notes 392-403 and accompanying
text While the case is of limited precedential value, it contains an interesting fact
pattern and illustrates the extension of statutory remedies to common law causes of
action.
1. The Lower Courts
The Sixth Circuit's decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub-
lishing Co. represented the culmination of a series of after-acquired
evidence cases that affirmed amongst several judicial circuits a serious
inroad into the make-whole remedial intent behind the federal
antidiscrimination statutes.' The facts in McKennon illustrate the impor-
tance of federal statutory protections against age discrimination. The
tendency of some managers to prefer young women for secretarial posi-
tions and to treat older experienced women unfairly is well-documented
in the case law, even though such practices are curbed to some extent
by legislative prohibitions.'
Mrs. McKennon, at age sixty-two, with thirty-nine years of service and
consistently excellent performance evaluations, was dismissed due to a
purported "staff reduction," while two days prior to McKennon's dismiss-
al, the Banner hired a twenty-six-year old secretary.2" The plaintiffs age-
discrimination claim was defeated because, during discovery, she admit-
ted having improperly copied several confidential company documents
and showing them to her husband.27 The district court granted summary
24. 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994), rev'd and re-
manded, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). Several commentators discussed the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in the McKennon case, even prior to the Court's grant of certiorari. See
Samuel A. Mills, Note, Toward an Equitable After-Acquired Evidence Rule, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1525, 1534-55 & 1534 n.3 (1994) (criticizing McKennon opinion as "best exam-
ple yet of the unjust consequences that routinely follow the application of Summers"
and reflecting that "proof" that McKennon would have been fired anyway was based
upon affirmation of company president); Kenneth G. Parker, After-Acquired Evidence
in Employment Discrimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEx. L REV. 403, 404
(1993) (citing McKennon as a case where employer who discriminated got a "free
ride because of ... fortuitous discovery of useful information"); Cheryl K. Zemelman,
The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The
Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV.
175, 200-01 & 200 n.193 (1993) (importing breach of contract analysis into Title VII
cases where later-discovered misconduct operates as "just cause" for discharge, re-
sulting in dismissal of petitioner's claim is inappropriate translation of public statutory
right into "purely private interests").
25. See Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993), dis-
cussed infra notes 301-18 and in accompanying text. The facts in that case involved
a woman who was terminated after forty years of service to a company not because
of poor performance, but because the president wanted a young secretary. The con-
fluence of age with gender discrimination in these cases seems clear. Older women
in particular appear subject to discrimination based upon stereotypic perceptions of
occupational image, i.e., that the ideal secretary should look young. Nonetheless,
McKennon's complaint alleged only age discrimination. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540.
26. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540; Ana Puga, Supreme Court Will Hear an Age Bias
Case with a Twist, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 1994, at 7; Greenhouse, supra note 12, at
A22; see supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (discussing facts in McKennon).
27. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540. And, as Justice John Paul Stevens noted at the end
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judgment to the defendant based upon this after-acquired evidence of
Mrs. McKennon's misconduct.2
The district court relied upon the rule in Summers v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto Insurance Co.,' a precedent from the Tenth Circuit that is
generally credited as creating the after-acquired evidence doctrine, also
at times referred to as the Summers doctrine or defense.' This doctrine
permits after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct (or resume or
application fraud) to bar an employer's liability for employment discrim-
ination.3' In most instances, the after-acquired evidence is unrelated to
the reason(s) proffered for the discharge, and by its definition, the infor-
mation was not known to the employer at the time of the discharge or
negative employment decision.' Thus, the after-acquired reason cannot
be deemed a causal factor in the employment decision, unlike the moti-
vating factors in mixed-motive cases where the defendant possesses both
legal (valid) and illegal (discriminatory) reasons for an employment deci-
sion.'
of oral arguments in McKennon, her wrongdoing "did not cause even a nickel of
damages for the Banner. At worst, she told a corporate secret to her husband
Justices Debate, supra note 12, at AA-3.
28. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 608.
29. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); see infra notes 155-73 and accompanying text
(discussing Summers).
30. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 606-08; see, e.g., William S. Waldo & Rosemary A.
Mahar, Lost Cause and Found Defense: Using Evidence Discovered After an
Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimination Claims, 9 LA. LAW. 31, 35 (1993) (dis-
cussing Summers defense); Jason M. Weinstein, No Harm, No Foul?: The Use of
After-Acquired Evidence in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 GEO.
WASH. L REv. 280, 293-96 (1994) (discussing Summers doctrine); see also James G.
Babb, Comment, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence as a Defense in Title VII Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 30 Hous. L REv. 1945, 1952-61 (1994) (discussing
Summers as beginning of after-acquired evidence and complete denial of relief).
31. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 541.
32. A good definition of after-acquired evidence in an employment discrimination
case is provided in Mardel v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994)
where the court states it:
denotes evidence of the employee's or applicant's misconduct or dishonesty
which the employer did not know about at the time it acted adversely to the
employee or applicant, but which it discovered at some point prior to, or,
more typically, during, subsequent legal proceedings; the employer then tries
to capitalize on that evidence to diminish or preclude entirely its liability for
otherwise unlawful employment discrimination.
Id. at 1222.
33. See Babb, supra note 30, at 1947-56 (discussing framework of Title VII claims
The grant of summary judgment in the McKennon case effectively
prevented the plaintiff from having her day in court to prove that she
was discriminated against. The district court noted that the Sixth Circuit
adopted the Summers doctrine in Johnson v. Honeywell Information
Systems, Inc.,' a case decided earlier the same year.' Mrs. McKennon
argued that her conduct (in copying several confidential documents) was
for her protection in light of her concern about her job.' The district
court found that the "nature and materiality" of the misconduct was the
central issue regarding the applicability of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine.37 The defendant established to the court's satisfaction that it
would have terminated plaintiff if it had known of her misconduct by
introducing an affidavit to that effect from the president of the compa-
ny.' Thus, the employer's testimony was pivotal to barring all relief for
in mixed-motive situations, application of after-acquired evidence in context of consti-
tutional claims of former employee, and the onset of Summers and progeny). See
generally Jennifer M. Follette, Complete Justice: Upholding the Principles of Title VII
Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. REV. 651,
660-68 (1993) (criticizing Summers approach, categorized as majority view on after-
acquired evidence, and use of mixed-motive analysis since after-acquired information
not a motivating factor).
34. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
35. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992).
36. Id. at 607.
37. Id. (citing Johnson, 955 F.2d at 413).
38. Id. at 608. The district court deemed petitioner's misconduct, in light of her
"status as a confidential secretary . . . adequate and just cause for her dismissal as a
matter of law." Id. (emphasis added). The district court characterized the president's
affidavit as "undisputed evidence" and later noted that plaintiff did not produce any
evidence that the company would have retained her if it had known of her miscon-
duct. Id. The Sixth Circuit also mentioned the testimony of other officers of the de-
fendant that supported the court's finding. 9 F.3d 539, 541 at n.3.
It seems unfair to grant summary judgment for defendant based upon the
defendant's own conclusory and self-serving statement of what it would have done
had it known of petitioner's misconduct. In employment discrimination cases, where
the defendant's real reasons for an employment decision have yet to be flushed-out,
and may be suspect in light of statutory protections, it is inappropriate for a court to
allow employer speculation (as to what it would have done if it had known about
after-acquired information) to preclude a full examination of the relevant evidence.
What petitioner did may have been wrong and an unprotected activity, but her allega-
tions concerning the defendant's actions deserve to be developed so that the entire
context of both parties' actions may be envisaged.
In particular, petitioner's concerns about the destruction of documents that she
felt would buttress her discrimination claim appear to have been based upon factual
occurrences that might be deemed to ameliorate her breach of duty. See Reply Brief
for Petitioner at 19, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995) (No. 93-1543) (discussing that respondent did not deny that documents may
contain evidence supporting petitioner's discrimination claim and that respondent
conceded that company officials had sought to destroy several of the documents and
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petitioner.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment to the Banner.' The appellate court's determination also relied
upon the employer's evidence that it would have fired petitioner had it
known of her misconduct. '° At the Supreme Court oral arguments, Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg remarked that the issue of whether McKennon
would have been fired for taking the documents is a fact question that
was inappropriately determined at the summary judgment stage. 1 The
company affidavits that carried the motion for summary judgment were
depositions, which, as Justice Ginsburg cautioned, are not the same as
presenting a witness in court with an opportunity for cross-examina-
tion.2 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court chose not to rule on the propri-
ety of that process in McKennon, perhaps because that issue was not
specified in the question presented in the petition for certiorari.'
had directed petitioner to shred them); see also McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540 n.1. The
company documents that Mrs. McKennon improperly copied and showed to her hus-
band included. a fiscal period payroll ledger dated 9/30/89; a profit and loss statement
dated 10/30/89; a note from Elise McMillan to Simpkins; a memo from I. Stoneking
(the comptroller and Mrs. McKennon's supervisor) to Irby C. Simpkins, Jr., dated
2/3/89; a handwritten note dated 2/8; and an agreement between the company and
one of its managing employees, notarized 3/1/89. Id.
39. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540.
40. Id. at 541. The petitioner even admitted under questioning in her deposition
that she would have been terminated for her actions. Id. at 541 n.3. The court refers
to the fact that petitioner did not dispute the company's assertions to the effect that
her conduct would have led to discharge if known to the employer. Id. at 540-41.
Petitioner's counsel appeared to concede this issue when indicating that "employee
misconduct might forfeit a right to reinstatement and front pay." Justices Debate,
supra note 12, at AA-1 (discussing oral arguments before Supreme Court in
McKennon). It should be noted, however, that absent the alleged discrimination and
subsequent litigation, the misconduct probably would not have been discovered in the
ordinary course of business.
41. Justices Debate, supra note 12, at AA-3. Justice Anthony Kennedy specifically
objected to questioning on the issue since the Court accepted the case based upon
the conclusion that Mrs. McKennon would have been fired for her misconduct Id.
Justice John Paul Stevens also clearly desired to confine the oral arguments to the
issue of liability presented in the petition. Id. at AA-1. Also, according to the Sixth
Circuit, this "would have been fired anyway" finding was not disputed. McKennon, 9
F.3d at 540-41.
42. Justices Debate, supra note 12, at AA-3.
43. See generally id. Despite the seemingly narrow question, the issue of what
relief might be appropriate, if any, appears to be a subset of the question. See Brief
for the United States and EEOC, McKennon v. Nashville Banner, (U.S.) No. 93-1543,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 140, D-1, at D-4 (July 25, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. & EEOC
The Sixth Circuit narrowed its consideration to a "sole issue in after-
acquired evidence cases... whether the employer would have fired the
plaintiff employee on the basis of the misconduct had it known of the
misconduct."' The appellate court refused to acknowledge that Mrs.
McKennon's copying and removal of the confidential documents may
have had a nexus or connection to her allegations of discrimination
against the company, at least not a nexus that would be relevant to the
application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine.46 Petitioner's argu-
ment that her activity was protected, in that it fell within opposition to
the employer's unlawful practice under the "opposition clause" of the
ADEA, was similarly not persuasive to the court.'
In McKennon, the Sixth Circuit affirmed its earlier wholesale adoption
of the Summers doctrine in Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems,
Inc.47 and later in MiUlligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Universi-
ty.' A discussion of these cases and others from the Sixth Circuit fol-
Brief] ("The issue that this case presents is what relief remains appropriate under the
ADEA and Title VII when, after an employee is unlawfully discharged, evidence of
employee misconduct is subsequently discovered.") (emphasis added).
It should be noted that petitioner maintains in her brief that defendant's evi-
dence on the "would have been fired anyway" issue is inadequate and something that
would be subject to objective determination upon remand once petitioner has estab-
lished the merits of her discrimination claim. Brief for Petitioner at 49-50, McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995) (No. 93-1543).
44. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 543 (citing Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological
Univ., 975 F.2d at 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993)).
45. Id.
46. Id. The court noted that "copying and removing confidential documents is
clearly not protected conduct." Id. at 543 n.7. Both cases cited by the Sixth Circuit
in support of this holding differ from McKennon in important respects. In Jefferies v.
Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980), the employer
terminated the petitioner because of her copying and internal dissemination of con-
fidential documents. See infra notes 383-90 and accompanying text discussing
Jefferies. In O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz
1992), the petitioner also disseminated the confidential information to a co-employee,
and this later-acquired information was used to bar petitioner's relief. See infra notes
259-75 and accompanying text discussing O'Day. The petitioner in McKennon only
showed the documents to her husband, not a fellow-employee of the company, and
thus similar managerial concerns were not implicated. See McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540.
O'Day also relied upon supportive language in an employee handbook that was not
present in McKennon. See infru note 266 and accompanying text. The employment
handbook in McKennon merely set out that the employment was "at will." See
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn.
1992).
47. 9 F.3d at 54142 (citing Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409
(6th Cir. 1992)); see infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text discussing Johnson.
48. 9 F.3d at 542 (citing MUlligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992)).
[Vol. 23: 65, 1995] Employment Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
lows the discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in McKennon.49
However, it should be highlighted at this juncture that the after-acquired
evidence doctrine applied by the Sixth and other circuits suffered from
serious shortcomings in terms of traditional legal theory and analysis.
The negative consequences of the doctrine heavily impact upon members
of protected classes under federal statutes, while providing a complete
and arguably undeserved defense to discriminators. The primarily com-
mon law "counterclaims" that employers may assert are allowed to carry
the day and bar important relief provided by federal statutes that gener-
ally preempt the lesser claims. This presents a problematic paradigm
wherein collateral or subordinate matters obstruct the development of a
primary claim.
It is also a concern that the courts seem to jumble the common law
and statutory causes of action together so that a theory such as "wrong-
ful discharge," that often describes a contractual claim under state law or
the arbitral standard of review under a collective bargaining agreement,
is used to support a "just cause defense" to "state civil rights claims."'
From there it is a short trip to suppress federal statutory rights, as well,
based upon the plaintiffs own, and at the time, unknown misconduct.5'
It is very telling that the district court in McKennon used the terms of art
for nonstatutory claims in summarizing its position:
The Court does not hold that any or all misconduct during employment consti-
tutes just cause for dismissal or serves as a complete defense to a wrongful dis-
charge action. The Court concludes, however, that Mrs. McKennon's misconduct,
by virtue of its nature and materiality and when viewed in the context of her sta-
tus as a confidential secretary, provides adequate and just cause for her dismissal
as a matter of law, even though her misconduct was unknown to the Banner at
the time of her discharge.'
While the courts seem to rely upon theories and defenses from non-
statutory civil claims in cases applying the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine, they are overlooking critical elements of traditional legal theories.
For how can courts say that a plaintiff has suffered "no legal damage" or
injury,' when, but for the defendant's discrimination, the after-acquired
information that provides a "valid" reason for termination may never
49. See infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text.
50. See McKennon, 797 F. Supp. 604, 607 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (discussing Johnson,
955 F.2d at 410-12).
51. Id. at 608.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 305 (6th Cir.
1992).
have been discovered? The approach sanctioned by the Sixth Circuit is
particularly problematic because it provides no inquiry into an element
that should, at a minimum, be established by the employer in order for
the doctrine to vindicate the defendant's responsibility: that the after-
acquired information would have been discovered absent the lawsuit
engendered by the defendant's alleged discrimination.' Otherwise, the
defendant's conduct may be, if one refers to tort theory, the proximate
cause of the injury to the plaintiff. That is, but for the defendant's (il-
legal) conduct, plaintiffs misconduct (or application fraud) would never
have been known to the defendant and would not have provided a valid
reason (that is to say, a nondiscriminatory reason, albeit after-the-fact)
for the discharge.55 In some instances, as was alleged by McKennon, the
defendant's discrimination may also have instigated the offensive conduct
on the part of the plaintiff.
And yet, the employer also has legitimate business interests that de-
serve protection under the legal system. Employee misconduct, disloyal-
ty, or dishonesty should not be ignored by the courts as they balance the
equities amidst the wrongdoing present on both sides. Interestingly, the
United States Supreme Court decided a case in 1994 that involved em-
ployee dishonesty in the context of an unfair labor practice case before
the National Labor Relations Board.'
A. Balancing an Unfair Labor Practice Against Employee Dishonesty
In ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 7 the Supreme Court affirned
an NLRB order that an employer reinstate a complainant with backpay
based upon the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice, despite the
fact that the former employee had lied about a reason for his tardi-
ness.' While the Supreme Court granted certiorari in ABF Freight to
54. The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits are also in accord with the Sixth
Circuit's approach. See infra notes 154-245 and accompanying text. The author argues
that a "would have been discovered anyway" standard should apply before remedies
are curtailed, assuming that the plaintiff establishes that the defendant is liable for
the discrimination. This would permit the employer to prove that the after-acquired
evidence would have been discovered even absent the discrimination litigation in
order to cut off future wage liability as of the date when the evidence would have
been discovered anyway.
55. See generally Zemelman, supra note 17, at 201 (discussing courts increasing
use of "tort law rhetoric" in Title VII cases and tendency to hinge Title VII liability
upon proof the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiffs injury).
56. See infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
57. 114 S. Ct. 835 (1994).
58. Id. at 837-40. The petitioner's "car trouble" excuse to the employer, which he
restated under oath at the Board hearing, was not credited by the Administrative Law
Judge. Id. at 837-38.
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consider whether the complainant's own misconduct should prevent the
Board's relief,' the Court affirmed that the absence of a legitimate ex-
cuse for tardiness provided only a pretext for the discharge.' This find-
ing supported the Board's order and the court of appeals' enforcement
decision."'
In the opinion of the court of appeals in ABF Freight, the employer's
contention that the employee's lie should bar his reinstatement and
backpay was rejected.' The Supreme Court affirmed, placing great
weight on Congress' delegation to the NLRB of remedial decisions in
unfair labor practice cases.' The Court expressed the question present-
ed as whether the Board must adopt a rule barring reinstatement when a
former employee testifies falsely, "not whether the Board might adopt
such a rule."' Despite the fact that false testimony was deemed "intoler-
able" and that "[p]erjury should be severely sanctioned in appropriate
cases," the Court concluded that such a case was not a "discharge for
cause" where the statute limits the remedial power of the Board.'
The concurring opinions authored by Justice KennedyM and Justice
Scaliad7 in ABF Freight are instructive as to the justices' concerns about
the conflict inherent in granting relief to an employee who has exhibited
dishonesty.' Justice Kennedy reflected that "honesty" and "the integrity
59. Id. at 838-39.
60. Id. at 838. Justice Stevens authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg
joined. Id. at 836-40. Justice Kennedy provided a separate concurring opinion. Id. at
840 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined with Justice Scalia in a con-
curring opinion. Id. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 838.
62. Id. This conclusion was due in part to the Board's wide discretion to further
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. Id.
63. Id. at 839-40.
64. Id. at 839.
65. Id. at 839 n.9; see 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). The Court referred to long-standing pre-
cedent regarding the "relation of remedy to policy [being] peculiarly a matter for ad-
ministrative competence." ABF Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 840 (citing Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)). It should be noted that after-acquired evidence
cases generally would not be categorized as discharges for cause either. After-ac-
quired evidence cases fall outside the mixed-motive paradigm, as will be discussed.
66. ABF Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 840 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. The preliminary matter indicated that Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion
in which Justice Kennedy joined, but at the close of the syllabus and at the start of
the concurrences, only Justice Kennedy is listed. See id. at 840 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
of the Board's process" are important interests that the Board has discre-
tion to "take into account in fashioning appropriate relief."'
Justice Scalia feared that the Board was growing too tolerant of perju-
ry in its adjudicatory hearings, as evidenced by the Board's failure to
expressly consider the possibility of denying relief in light of the petition-
er lying under oath."0 Justice Scalia took issue with the Board's "under-
stand[ing]" of the petitioner's lie in light of his "'history of mistreat-
ment.'"' He found the Board's order "at the very precipice of the tolera-
ble," because the Board failed to "consider and discuss" the option of
limiting relief.'
The ABF Freight decision dealt with some issues separate from those
presented in McKennon. The concerns in ABF Freight in part relate to
the significance of maintaining the integrity of the administrative agency
process, and the facts in the case are more analogous to mixed-motive
than to after-acquired evidence cases. And yet, ABF Freight provides a
clear precedent on the issue of the infringement of legitimate employer
interests where those interests are subservient to important federal statu-
tory policies. The Supreme Court in ABF Freight permitted the enforce-
ment of an award of reinstatement with backpay to a discriminatee who
had engaged in numerous acts of dishonesty because the NLRB deter-
mined that the real reason for the discharge was a discriminatory rea-
son. Following similar logic in after-acquired evidence cases would
grant a plaintiff the right to establish an employer's liability for dis-
crimination, and only admit after-acquired evidence to influence the rem-
edy.
69. Id. at 840 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also expressed agreement
with Justice Scalia's separate opinion. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. Id at 841-42 (Scalia, J., concurring). This case contrasts with the facts in
McKennon where the plaintiff told the truth about her misconduct in depositions. See
supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
71. ABF Preight, 114 S. Ct. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia terms the
Board's failure to adequately consider the false testimony "insouciance." Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
72. Id. at 842 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia hypothesized that posting a no-
tice indicating that the petitioner would have been reinstated "but for his false tes-
timony" would have made clear "that peojury does not pay." Id. at 843 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
73. Id. at 838, 840.
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2. The United States Supreme Court
"A right which goes unrecognized by anybody is not worth very much."
Simone Weil,
The Need for Roots (1952)
a. Liability
In an unexpected showing of unanimity, the Supreme Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit in McKennon.74 The opinion, authored by Justice An-
thony M. Kennedy, broadly reinforced the important public policies em-
bodied in federal equal employment legislation, policies that are support-
ed by deterrence and compensation for injuries.5 The Court noted the
conflicting views among the courts of appeals as its motivation for re-
solving the question "whether all relief must be denied when an employ-
ee has been discharged in violation of the ADEA and the employer later
discovers some wrongful conduct that would have led to discharge if it
had been discovered earlier."
76
74. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995); Susan
R. Kneller, Discrimination: Supreme Court Says Employee Misdeeds Don't Shield
Employers from Bias Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.15 at AA-1 (Jan. 24, 1995)
(describing the claimant's attorney as "very pleased with decision and surprised by
the [Clourt's [sic] unanimity").
75. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884. While the question was phrased in terms of
the ADEA, the opinion discussed the "common substantive features" and "common
purpose" that the ADEA shares with Title VII. Id. Commentators immediately inter-
preted the decision as applying broadly to job discrimination proscriptions. See, e.g.,
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rule for Employees in a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1995, at Al; Kneller, supra note 74, at AA-1.
76. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883. The Supreme Court grouped the two major
camps" on the question of after-acquired evidence barring relief by comparing the
major precedents. Id. The first camp held that after-acquired evidence may bar relief.
Id. (citing Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 12 F.3d 176 (10 Cir. 1994); McKennon, 9 F.3d 539 (6th
Cir. 1993) (case below); Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992);
Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); Smallwood v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984)). The sec-
ond camp held that after-acquired evidence does not bar relief. Id. (citing Mardell v.
Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994); Kristufek v. Hussman
Foodservice Co., Toastmaster Division, 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Wallace v. Dunn
Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir.
1995)).
All of these decisions are discussed in detail in parts LB - IV of this article. The
The Supreme Court held that the district court and court of appeals
that reached the "legal conclusion... that after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing which would have resulted in discharge bars employees
from any relief... [were] incorrect."77 Where the Sixth Circuit deemed
the presence of discrimination "irrelevant" in light of McKennon's mis-
conduct that was categorized as "supervening ground[s] for termination,"
the Supreme Court concluded "that a violation of the ADEA cannot be so
altogether disregarded."" The statutory scheme of the ADEA was exam-
ined by the Court in the context of Congress' broad program to eliminate
workplace discrimination, and the enforcement of remedies was elevated
as serving more than the interest of the private plaintiffs." The Court
found that "[iut would not accord with this [statutory] scheme if after-ac-
quired evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination
operates, in every instance, to bar all relief." '
Each individual case provides an opportunity to elucidate "patterns of
noncompliance," making the "efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms...
one measure of the success of the Act."' Remedies were similarly enno-
bled in the Court's view in that they "serve as a 'spur or catalyst' to
cause employers 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges' of discrimination. "8
The Supreme Court addressed the inappropriate reliance of the Sixth
and Tenth Circuits upon the case of Mt. Healthy City Board of Educa-
tion v. Doyle.' The Court deemed Mt. Healthy "inapplicable" to the
McKennon case in that Mt. Healthy involved a mixed-motive termination
where the employer's legitimate reason alone would have served to justi-
fy the discharge.' This was not the case in McKennon because the evi-
dence of misconduct could not have motivated the employer's decision
Court effectively compared those employment discrimination decisions that barred
relief based upon after-acquired evidence with those that permit the plaintiff to es-
tablish the defendant's liability, and then allow the after-acquired evidence to alter
the remedy where appropriate. It is interesting that the Court framed the question
"whether all relief must be denied" very similarly to the question in ABF Freight
where the issue was whether the Board must adopt a rule precluding reinstatement
and back pay. Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text
discussing ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct. 835, 839 (1994).
77. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
78. Id. at 883-84 (citing McKennon, 9 F.3d at 542).
79. Id. at 884-85.
80. Id. at 884.
81. Id. at 885.
82. Id. at 884 (alterations in original and internal quotations marks and citations
omitted) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
83. Id. at 885 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)).
84. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284-87).
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since the employer did not learn of the misconduct until after the term-i-
nation.'
The Tenth Circuit precedent upon which the Sixth Circuit relied, Sum-
mers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., involved facts in
which the employer had some knowledge of the employee's wrongdoing
prior to the decision to terminate.' This may have provided the genesis
for the Tenth Circuit's inappropriate reliance upon the mixed-motive
analysis in Mt. Healthy. In any event, the Supreme Court in McKennon
makes clear that evidence acquired after the employment decision was
made simply cannot be deemed causal and will not provide a complete
defense to liability.8 7 This outcome follows both precedent and basic
logic.
b. Remedies
"There is always a time to make right what is wrong."
Susan Griffin,
I Like to Think of Harriet Tubman,
Like the Iris of an Eye (1976)
The McKennon opinion also responded to a number of important ques-
tions about the impact of after-acquired evidence upon the remedies
available in employment discrimination cases. The Court reinforced the
potential for equitable relief despite a defendant's assertion of the
plaintiffs unclean hands.'M This potential exists because of the "impor-
tant national policies... [and] public purposes" embodied in the legis-
lation and the actual language of the ADEA'
85. Id. The Supreme Court referred to language from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989), where the plurality noted the distinction between "proving
that the same decision would have been justified . . . [which] is not the same as
proving that the same decision would have been made." Id. For an expanded discus-
sion of the Price Waterhouse decision, see Gerard A. Madek & Christine N. O'Brien,
Women Denied Partnerships: From "Hishon" to '?rice Waterhouse v. Hopkins," 7
HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 257 (1990).
86. 864 F.2d 700, 702-03 (10th Cir. 1988). See infra notes 155-73 and accompanying
text discussing Summers.
87. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 885-86. The Court quoted the following remedial language from the
ADEA.
[Tihe court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including
And yet, the misconduct of a plaintiff may be relevant to the available
remedies in light of the employer's legitimate interests.' The Court con-
cluded that an "employee's wrongdoing must be taken into account...
lest the employer's legitimate concerns be ignored."1 Justice Kennedy
noted that the proper remedies must be determined case by case in light
of the varying facts and equities involved. 2 Nonetheless, the Court set
out as a general rule that would apply to the McKennon case, that rein-
statement and front pay would not be appropriate where the employer
"would have terminated [the employee] ... in any event and upon lawful
grounds."2
Progressing to the determination of backpay, the Court acknowledged
that this posed "a more difficult problem."' While the concept of restor-
ing a plaintiff "to the position he or she would have been in absent the
discrimination" was acknowledged as an important goal,' the Court ex-
pressed its concern that this "principle is difficult to apply with precision
where there is after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have
led to termination on legitimate grounds had the employer known about
it."' The Court "cannot require the employer to ignore the information,
even if it... might have gone undiscovered absent the suit."'
The Supreme Court provided trial courts with the following remedial
guidance-that "[tihe beginning point.., should be calculation of
backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new in-
formation was discovered." 8 The Court also instructed that "extraordi-
nary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either
party" may be considered in fashioning the relief.' The Court cautioned
without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promo-
tion, or enforcing the liability for [amounts owing to a person as a result of
a violation of this chapter].
Id. at 886 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988 & Supp. V)).
90. See id. at 886.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Such an order would be "inequitable and pointless." Id. This rule clearly
does not prohibit the use of reinstatement and front pay in cases where the employ-
ee wrongdoing does not amount to a dischargeable offense. See id. The Court other-
wise framed the issue of relief as permitting discretion to the court that is familiar
with the facts in each case. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. This starting point accords with calculations used by the National Labor
Relations Board. See John Cuneo, Inc., 298 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16, 123 (1990) (ter-
minating back pay as of the date when the respondent acquired knowledge of the
discriminatee's falsification of his employment application and history).
99. McKennon, 115 S. Ct at 886.
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that it would undermine the statutory objectives if backpay was barred
pursuant to an "absolute rule." "®
The Supreme Court left the remedial determination largely to the dis-
cretion of the trial courts.'' There is an invitation here to vary the cal-
culation of damages based upon the equities of the situation."° Within
the parameters of the appropriate statute(s), courts are instructed to
award relief that will meet the objectives of the public policy behind the
statute(s), while also considering the legitimate interests of both parties
in the litigation."n
Finally, the Court outlined that in order for an employer to use after-
acquired evidence, "it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of
such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on
those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the
discharge."'°Thus, the process places a prerequisite burden of proof on
the defendant prior to its introduction of the after-acquired informa-
tion."° Implicitly, it would seem that after-acquired evidence of lesser
misconduct (not enough to give rise to termination) is suppressed, at
least until relief is considered.
Arguably, if the offensive acts are not dischargeable, the employer
would be required to reinstate the plaintiff if such relief is requested.
Thereafter, the employee would be subjected to appropriate discipline,
meted out by the employer in a nondiscriminatory manner. The courts
need not involve themselves regarding these internal penalties in most
instances, as long as the discipline is consonant with other similar inci-
dents at the company and is not retaliatory. Where a grievance-arbitra-
tion process is in effect, such would be the usual route for an employee
to object to the severity or perceived unfairness of the punishment.
The Supreme Court's decision in McKennon will encourage employers
to proceed to discovery promptly when defending an employment dis-
crimination case because McKennon confirms that new and damaging
information regarding the plaintiff may sever the continuing accumula-
tion of backpay as of the date of the discovery." The Court under-
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 886-87 (emphasis added).
105. See id. at 886.
106. See id. This strategy of prompt investigation of an employment discrimination
charge because of the possibility that the after-acquired evidence would cut off
scored that the federal courts may prevent employer abuse of discovery
through Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by invoking
the award of attorney's fees."7
The McKennon opinion does not specifically comment on the trial
court's use of summary judgment to resolve the "would have been fired
anyway" question. Judge Ginsburg reflected at the oral arguments that
the use of summary judgment to determine this fact issue was inappro-
priate, but Justices Kennedy and Stevens successfully sought to confine
the Court's consideration of the case to the question presented in the
petition for certiorari." The Court's substantive rule that all liability is
not barred by the discovery of after-acquired evidence relegates the
defendant's burden of proving that the plaintiff "would have been fired
anyway" to the relief stage.1" The breadth of the remedy is thus con-
fined where the plaintiff engaged in a dischargeable offense." There
may also be instances where the plaintiffs damages are merely nominal,
and yet the discriminatee's right to establish the defendant's liability
protects the important public policies underlying the federal statutes.
McKennon squarely rebuts the general premise that after-acquired
evidence of employee wrongdoing bars evaluation of a plaintiffs employ-
ment discrimination claim."' In its discussion of the issues presented,
the Court avoided creating boundaries that would inhibit the federal
courts from designing remedial relief appropriate to the facts found in
each case."2 This resolution allows the circuits to adopt somewhat
varying formulae at the remedial stage."3
This article next outlines pertinent decisions from the federal courts
that portend the inclination of the circuits regarding the importance of
after-acquired evidence in employment discrimination cases."4 While
the question of liability is countermanded by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in McKennon in numerous instances, the disposition of the courts
backpay liability has of course been advocated for employers prior to the McKennon
decision. See James A. Burstein & Steven L Hamann, Better Late Than Never-After-
Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 EMPLOYEE REL UJ. 193,
203 (1993).
107. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (1988 & Supp.
V)).
108. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text discussing oral arguments before
the Supreme Court in McKennon and the question in the petition for certiorari.
109. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
113. McKennon, 115 S. Ct at 886; see also supra notes 90-100 and accompanying
text.
114. See infra notes 121-378 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23: 65, 1995] Employment Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
when faced with determining the remedy in future cases is illuminat-
ed."
5
The following discussion of pre-McKennon precedent from the circuits
groups the camps in accordance with the Supreme Court's reference to
the conflict among the circuits as briefly set out in McKennon."' The
remaining Sixth Circuit decisions are analyzed here immediately after
McKennon."7 Thereafter, opinions from the Tenth, Eighth, Seventh
(through 1992), and Fourth Circuits, and a district court case from the
Ninth Circuit complete the discussion of cases permitting after-acquired
evidence to create a bar to liability."8 Then, decisions of the Eleventh,
Seventh (1993), and Third Circuits present the view, now binding by Su-
preme Court precedent, that after-acquired evidence may not automati-
cally bar liability for employment discrimination."9 Cases involving re-
lated issues from the First and Fifth Circuits and the State of Connecti-
cut are also analyzed.2"
B. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University'2'
"I don't think secrets agree with me;
I feel rumpled in my mind since you told me that."
Louisa May Alcott
Little Women (1868)
In MiUligan-Jensen, the plaintiff falsified her employment application
with the defendant by omitting a prior DUI conviction.2 She was hired
115. See infra notes 121-378 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 76.
117. See ifra notes 121-53 and accompanying text.
118. The district court decision from the Ninth Circuit, O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992), was not referenced by the Court in
McKennon, but is discussed infra in notes 259-79 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 76; see also infra notes 319-57 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 335-403 and accompanying text; Sabree v. United Bhd. of Car-
penters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding after-acquired
evidence had to be known at the time of termination); Jefferies v. Harris County
Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding employer's confidenti-
ality interests outweighed employee's right to oppose alleged employer discrimination);
Preston v. Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Co., 647 A.2d 364 (Conn. App. 1994) (holding
front-pay and future wages were against public policy when employee would have
been fired anyway).
121. 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dis-
missed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993).
122. MiUlligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 303.
as a public safety officer by the university where, according to the dis-
trict court's findings, she suffered discriminatory treatment due to her
gender.'23 In the course of preparing to defend itself against the
plaintiffs Title VII lawsuit, the university discovered plaintiffs omission
on her application."24 The district court found that this was a material
falsification and one that would have resulted in termination."n The trial
court analyzed the case as one of mixed-motive and determined that the
employer did not establish that its decision to discharge Milligan-Jensen
"would have been the same absent the unlawful motives.2
The district court struck a remedial compromise by awarding the
plaintiff fifty percent of the normal recovery.'27 The Sixth Circuit re-
jected this approach in light of its decision in Johnson v. Honeywell
Information System, Inc. in which the court granted summary judgment
to the defendant because of the plaintiffs resume fraud." The court
affirmed its commitment to the Summers rule, which it interpreted as
one of causation."n Because plaintiff would not have been hired or
would have been fired if the university had become aware of her mate-
rial omission on her employment application, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that "the plaintiff suffered no legal damage by being fired." " The issue
of whether Milligan-Jensen was discriminated against thus became "irrel-
evant."13'
The Clinton Administration, seeking a ruling that after-acquired evi-
dence does not bar liability for discrimination, urged the Supreme Court
to grant review of the MiUlligan-Jensen decision.32 The Court granted
123. Id. (citing Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 767 F. Supp. 1403,
1406-10 (W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2991, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct 22 (1993)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 303-04 & 304 n.1 (citing MiUigan-Jensen, 767 F. Supp. at 1410 (indicat-
ing that plaintiff would have been terminated because of the falsification rather than
the prior conviction)).
126. Id. at 303.
127. Id. at 304. Judge Hillman balanced the equities in what the Sixth Circuit
deemed a "Solomon-like" approach. Id.
128. Id. (citing Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys. Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992)).
See infr notes 142-53 and accompanying text discussing the Johnson case.
129. MiUigan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 304.
130. Id. at 305.
131. Id. at 304-05. The trial court found the employer liable on plaintiffs charges of
sex discrimination and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. Id. at 302-03. The
evidence of overt discrimination was pervasive because Milligan-Jensen was repeatedly
treated disparately on everything from job assignments to evaluations and a disciplin-
ary action for a uniform code violation. Id. at 303. In addition, she received a badge
number that had previously been allocated to a woman because she was a woman
and was told that her duties and shift went along with the lady's job. Id.
132. See Burstein & Hamann, supra note 106, at 193.
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certiorari in the case, but a subsequent settlement resulted in the dis-
missal of the petition, leaving the conflict among the circuits unre-
solved."3
Two other relevant court of appeals decisions from the Sixth Circuit
are discussed herein, with the more recent discussed first.
C. Dotson v. United States Postal Service"3
The Dotson case involved the post-termination discovery of employ-
ment application fraud." On his written application forms, the plaintiff
omitted prior health and employment information including reasons for
previous dismissals and his current use of prescription drugs."u Also,
Dotson lied in an interview about his back problem, indicating that there
was no current problem when in fact he had received treatment and
medication just three days earlier.3 ' The Sixth Circuit followed the
Summers rule and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
handicap discrimination charges upon the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment."u
The court, in a per curiam opinion, noted that the plaintiff was not
qualified for the position because he "lacked the honesty and trustworthi-
ness required."'" The employer would not have hired the plaintiff had it
known of his application fraud, and thus, this evidence, even though
discovered post-termination, was admissible and "relevant to his claim of
injury."" The Sixth Circuit followed Summers and Johnson, permitting
the after-acquired evidence to "'preclude[ ] the grant of any present relief
or remedy.'.' 4
133. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
134. 977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992).
135. Dotson, 977 F.2d at 977.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The employer terminated the plaintiff based upon his inability to carry the
mail. Id. The plaintiffs suit charged the employer with handicap discrimination. Id.
See iqtra notes 155-73 and accompanying text discussing Summers.
139. Dotson, 977 F.2d at 977-78.
140. Id. at 978.
141. Id. (quoting Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708
(10th Cir. 1988), overn-ed by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.
Ct. (1995)); see also Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
D. Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.'
The Johnson decision is the circuit precedent relied upon in the
McKennon and MiUigan-Jensen Sixth Circuit opinions." Interestingly,
plaintiffs causes of action in Johnson alleged a breach of contract be-
cause her discharge was allegedly not for just cause and also alleged a
violation of Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act." Johnson's
wrongful discharge claim included allegations that she was terminated in
retaliation for her efforts to achieve affirmative action goals, but no vio-
lations of federal statutes were plead. '45 Johnson's performance came
under criticism more than a year before her discharge.4
During discovery, "glaring misrepresentations" from Johnson's employ-
ment application were uncovered, including false educational credentials
and work experience.'47 The application made clear that false informa-
tion "may be cause for immediate discharge."" The Sixth Circuit, "exer-
cising diversity jurisdiction," noted that Michigan law would permit the
use of after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing to defend a
wrongful discharge claim.'49 The court further held that the employer
was entitled to summary judgment because Johnson's application mis-
representations amounted to just cause for discharge as a matter of
law.150
As to whether relief under the Michigan Civil Rights Act should be
similarly barred by Johnson's misrepresentations, the Sixth Circuit held
that it should, agreeing with the Summers rationale. 5' The court found
that the employer established that "it would not have hired Johnson and
that it would have fired her had it become aware of her resume
fraud."52 In addition, the Sixth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs allega-
142. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
143. See supra notes 26, 38-39 and accompanying text.
144. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 411; see also MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 37.2101 to
37.2804 (Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (West 1985)).
145. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 411.
146. Id. Both Johnson's supervisors and those managers that she worked with "com-
plain[ed] of her unavailability by phone, lack of cooperation, and ineffectiveness." Id.
Despite this criticism, the plaintiff admittedly failed to alter her work habits because
she considered her work satisfactory. Id.
147. Id. at 411-12.
148. Id. at 411.
149. Id. at 412-13.
150. Id. at 413. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the misrepresentations were materi-
al and that the employer relied upon them because the employer would not have
hired the plaintiff without the requisite educational credentials. Id. at 414.
151. Id. at 415.
152. Id.
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tions would not have amounted to the statement of a violation of the
"opposition clause" under the Michigan Act."i
I. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CREATES AND CONFIRMS THE DOCTRINE THAT
AFtER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE MAY BAR LIABILITY
FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
In this section, the Tenth Circuit's Summers decision is discussed
prior to its 1994 interpretation of the Summers doctrine in O'Driscoll v.
Hercules Inc.I4
A. Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co."n
In the decision that is generally credited with creating the affirmative
defense of after-acquired evidence,'" the Tenth Circuit was faced with
an employment discrimination case that the court claimed "should have
been weeded out before any trial.""7 Plaintiff Summers' work history as
a field claims representative was riddled with falsification of records and
reports.'" His allegations of age and religious discrimination were
viewed by the court in the context of his repeated erroneous reports and
claims that eventually gave rise to warnings and to Summers' probation
for two weeks without pay." Thereafter, Summers resumed work but
153. Id. at 415-16; see also MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 37.2701(a) (West 1985) (stating
the "opposition clause" of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act).
154. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988),
overruled by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115
S. Ct. 1086 (1995), rev'd and remanded, 52 F.3d 294 (10th Cir. 1995).
155. Summers, 864 F.2d at 700.
156. See Gian Brown, Employee Misconduct and the Affirmative Defense of 'After-
Acquired Evidence," 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 381, 394 (1993) (discussing Summers as
first articulation of affirmative defense); Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The
Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN.
L REV. 145, 163 (1993) (discussing Summers as "first in a series of after-acquired
evidence cases that approve of a total denial of relief based on the plaintiffs lack of
irjury"); Pauline Yoo, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 25 COLuM. HuM. RTs. L.
REV. 219, 220 (1993) (same); see also Babb, supra note 30.
157. Summers, 864 F.2d at 709. The court also noted that "obvious cases should be
weeded out before trial." Id.
158. See id. at 702, 709.
159. Id. at 702. Summers was 56 years old at the time of his discharge and was
also a member of the Mormon church. Id.
was discharged seven months later by his employer, purportedly because
of a "poor attitude" and problems with interpersonal relations."u
The employer's characterization of the reasons for plaintiffs termina-
tion was critical to the development of the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine. State Farm discovered a fair amount of damaging information
about Summers prior to his discharge, but rather than expressly relying
upon this objective evidence, the employer offered other fairly subjective
reasons as the cause for termination.'6' State Farm later defended its
action with information gathered almost four years after the ternina-
tion.'" This information reflected over 150 instances of falsified records
by Summers, eighteen of which occurred after the plaintiff returned from
probation and received a warning that future falsifications would have
dire consequences." Notably, the plaintiff did not deny any of these fal-
sifications."
The severity and persistence of Summers' misconduct provided the
Tenth Circuit with a dilemma because there were valid, nondis-
criminatory reasons for the plaintiffs termination that were known to the
defendant at the time of discharge.'" Many more instances of falsifica-
tions were discovered after the termination, in a sense buttressing the
facts originally available to the employer prior to Summers' termina-
tion.'" However, because the employer did not assert plaintiffs falsifi-
cations as a motivating reason for its decision, the court was left in the
unhappy predicament of either ignoring evidence, both pre-existing and
after-acquired, that the plaintiff did not deserve continued employment or
allowing those facts to affect plaintiffs claim."7 The Tenth Circuit
chose the latter route."
The Summers court analogized the case to one in which a company
doctor alleges a discriminatory termination and is then discovered to be
unqualified as a doctor."6 The court asserted that this "masquerading
160. Id. at 702-03.
161. Id. Thus, the fact pattern in Summers resembled one of mixed-motive, which
may have accounted for the Tenth Circuit's analytical excursion in that direction. See
id. at 705-08. The Tenth Circuit summarized the employer's prior knowledge of
Summers' wrongdoing and noted that the "reason given [for his discharge] was
Summers' generally unsatisfactory job performance." Id. at 708. The court also noted
that rather than discharging Summers when it first learned of his falsifications, the
employer placed him on probation. Id.
162. Id. at 703.
163. See id. at 702-03.
164. Id. at 703.
165. Id. at 702.
166. Id. at 703.
167. Id. at 703-05.
168. Id. at 705-09.
169. Id. at 708.
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doctor" would not be entitled to relief, and "Summers [was] in no better
position."7 ° Despite the court's admission that after-acquired evidence
could not be deemed a "cause" for the discharge, the court found it rele-
vant to the plaintiffs claim of "injury" and allowed it to "preclude the
grant of any present relief or remedy."'7' The Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer."m While
this outcome may have appeared equitable in light of the facts in Sum-
mers, it created a dangerous precedent that violated basic precepts of
employment discrimination law."m
B. O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc.
74
A three-judge panel for the Tenth Circuit revisited its Summers deci-
sion in the O'Driscoll case.'75 In O'Driscoll, the plaintiff alleged numer-
ous federal civil rights violations, including age discrimination, and viola-
tions of state law involving breach of employment contract and wrongful
termination. 76 Prior to trial, the defendant discovered that plaintiffs
employment application contained a number of misstatements." The
plaintiff misrepresented her age, her date of high school graduation, her
educational attainment, her children's ages, and her prior work history
(which was also incomplete) on the application form.'78 She also lied
about her age on a federal government security clearance form and mis-
represented her son's age on the health insurance membership applica-
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 709.
173. It is often stated that "hard cases make bad law." Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
in McKennon overruled the Summers decision, declaring that Summers' reliance on
Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), was inappropriate
because Mt. Healthy addressed a mixed-motive case. McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995). See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text
174. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995),
rev'd and remanded, 52 F.3d 294 (10th Cir. 1995).
175. 12 F.3d at 179. Circuit Judge Baldock wrote the O'Drisco/U opinion, which was
also heard by Judges Barrett and Ebel. Id. at 177.
176. Id. at 177. Plaintiff was discharged after more than six years of employment at
the defendant company. Id.
177. Id. at 177-78.
178. Id. The plaintiff represented that she was five years younger than she actually
was. Id. at 177.
tion, thus making him eligible for coverage when his true age would have
disqualified him."
The employment application form and the security clearance form
both contained a warning about misrepresentations directly above the
plaintiffs signature."8° The employment application form warned that
any misrepresentation may result in termination of employment without
liability to the employer, and the security clearance form further warned
of criminal penalties.'8 ' The defendant company provided evidence that
the plaintiff would have been terminated had the company been aware of
this application fraud."
The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, relying
upon the Summers decision."a The plaintiff appealed, arguing that her
misconduct was neither serious nor pervasive, that the misrepresenta-
tions were not material, and that a genuine issue of material fact re-
mained as to whether the employer would have terminated the plaintiff
had it known of her misconduct."
As the O'DriscoU panel reviewed the Summers decision, it stated its
belief that "Summers was terminated for reasons unrelated to the claim
falsifications. " " While this statement is not actually incorrect, it ignores
the complex texture of the facts in Summers, thus allowing for a bold
statement of the Summers rule." The court in O'DriscoU responded to
the plaintiffs argument on appeal, stating that for the Summers rule to
apply:
[TIhere is no threshold requirement of serious and pervasive misconduct. Rather,
for after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct to bar relief in a termination
case, Summers merely requires proof that (1) the employer was unaware of the
misconduct when the employee was discharged; (2) the misconduct would have
justified discharge; and (3) the employer would indeed have discharged the em-
ployee, had the employer known of the misconduct"
The plaintiffs misrepresentations were repeated and, in the court's
view, "demonstrated a pattern of dishonesty and disregard for the
truth." " In reaction to the plaintiffs assertion that her misrepresen-




183. Id. The headnote to the case indicated that partial summary judgment was
granted. Id. at 176.
184. Id. at 178.
185. Id. at 179 (citing Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 864 F.2d 700,
702-03) (10th Cir. 1988).
186. See supra notes 155-73 and accompanying text discussing Summers.
187. O'DriscoU, 12 F.3d at 179 (citing Summers, 864 F.2d at 708); see also Johnson
v. Honeywell Info. Sys. Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
188. O'DriscoU, 12 F.3d at 180.
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tations were not material, the court noted that the misrepresentations
were serious and numerous." In light of the sensitivity of the plaintiffs
former position as a quality control inspector, and the employer's explicit
reservation of right to terminate an employee who makes a misrepresen-
tation on the employment application, the court determined that the
"[p]laintiffs misconduct would have justified her termination." " The
O'Driscoll court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact re-
mained regarding whether the employer would have terminated plaintiff
had it known of her misconduct and affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment.'9'
Ill. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
A. Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc.'92
In Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., the Eighth Circuit chose to
follow the rule adopted by the Tenth Circuit in the Summers case."
The court noted that the Summers rule was better applied than that of
the Eleventh Circuit's rule in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co." to
the context of the application fraud with which the court was faced in
Welch." In Welch, the petitioner misrepresented his prior job history by
excluding his most recent job as a machinist where he was terminated
after one month for unsatisfactory performance; thus, the Eighth Circuit
would forbid recovery for an unlawful (discriminatory) discharge "if the
189. Id. at 179-80.
190. Id. at 180. The court's phraseology is of interest here. The conclusion avoids
the fact that the misconduct was discovered after the termination. As the Supreme
Court in McKennon quoted from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252
(1989) (plurality opinion), "proving that the same decision would have been justi-
fied . . . is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made."
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995).
191. O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 180-81. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in
McKennon, the O'Driscoll judgment was vacated. See O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1086 (1995). The Tenth Circuit then reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the defendant and remanded to the district court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's McKennon decision. 52 F.3d 294 (1995).
192. 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994).
193. Id. at 1405 (citing Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700
(10th Cir. 1988), overruled by McKennon v. Nashville Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct 1086
(1995)).
194. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992); see ivfra notes 280-300 discussing Wallace.
195. Welch, 23 F.3d at 1405.
employer establishes that it would not have hired the employee had it
known of the misrepresentation."'"
Nonetheless, the court deemed the district court's grant of summary
judgment improper because it was based upon the company president's
self-serving affidavit.'97 The court reasoned that the employer "bears a
substantial burden of establishing that the policy [dictating that an appli-
cant would not be hired who misrepresented his employment history]
pre-dated the hiring and firing of the employee in question and that the
policy constitute[d] more than mere contract or employment application
boilerplate. " " The employer's affidavit did not establish the material
fact that the employer would not have hired the petitioner but for his
misrepresentation of his employment history; thus the court remanded
the case to the district court for development of this factual determina-
tion. 1
Judge Arnold dissented in Welch, clearly stating that the Eleventh
Circuit's Wallace decision "has the better argument on the issue of after-
acquired evidence. "2" In a well-reasoned analysis, Judge Arnold under-
scored the important public policy concerns that generated the
antidiscrimination statutes."0 ' When a defendant employer has no
knowledge of an employee's fraudulent misrepresentation, the fraudulent
activity "could not have provided any part of the defendant's motive." '
Judge Arnold quoted a passage from T.S. Eliot--"'To do the right deed
for the wrong reason'"-and concluded that the objects of deterring dis-
crimination and compensating those who have suffered from discrimina-
tory acts require that the court "examine a defendant's mind for what it
contained, not what it might have contained."2"
196. Id. The court specifically mentioned that its reference to the hiring situation
did "not vitiate the 'would have fired' prong of the Summers rule." Id. at 1405 n.2.
197. Id. at 1406.
198. Id. Arguably, the Eighth Circuit's characterization of the weight afforded the
employer's affidavit is relevant to the similar issue raised in the McKennon case.
The Welch opinion, authored by Chief Justice Beam, referred to other circuits
that have upheld summary judgments in the application fraud context based primarily
upon employer affidavits. Id. (citing Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409,
414 (6th Cir. 1992) and Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256-57 (7th Cir.
1992)). Yet, the Welch court found the employer's affidavit insufficient Id.
199. Id. at 1406.
200. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). Judge Arnold's rationale accords with the Su-
preme Court's McKennon opinion. See id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). Judge Arnold would place the petitioner where he
would have been absent the discrimination, thus compensating for losses suffered
between the time of discriminatory discharge and "the time he would have been fired
on account of the discovery of relevant facts." Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
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The dissent also compared the instant case to one in which a plaintiff
is a tortfeasor, noting that the plaintiffs tortious conduct "could not
possibly excuse the commission of a tort against him. "2N The dissent
could have noted that this would be particularly true in cases where the
torts of plaintiff and defendant are temporally unrelated, as in the Welch
and other after-acquired evidence cases; the employment discrimination
is separated in time, and often in fact, from the reason for the employ-
ment decision. Judge Arnold aptly infers that a defendant would not be
exempt from a penalty for battering a plaintiff "on the ground that he
would not have been available for battering but for his misrepresenta-
tions."2' The dissenter saw this example as analogous to the case at
bar.' This logic implies that although a plaintiff commits a wrong, that
does not place the plaintiff completely outside the protection of the law.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ADHERES TO THE SUMMERS
DOcTRINE THROUGH 1992
Two earlier Seventh Circuit decisions are briefly discussed herein,
followed by the discussion of Washington v. Lake County,20 which the
Supreme Court in McKennon referenced as being in accordance with the
Sixth and Tenth Circuits.2' The Seventh Circuit's later turnabout in
Kristufek v. Hussman Foodservice Co. 21 is analyzed in part VII of this
article, amidst the harmonious Eleventh and Third Circuits, which also
refused to allow after-acquired evidence to bar all relief.2'0 The
Kristufek decision is not such a surprise in light of the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., which is discussed next."'
204. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
206. See id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). Judge Arnold further noted that "even a
trespasser is entitled to the benefit of the rule that the offended landowner may not
intentionally injure him." Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). Analogously, even when a
plaintiff would not have been hired except for misrepresentations that misled the de-
fendant employer, the plaintiff would still be entitled to the basic protection of non-
discriminatory treatment in the workplace. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). However, a
wrongdoing plaintiffs right to reenter the offending workplace could not be legally
mandated because the plaintiff did not lawfully possess that right Id. (Arnold, CJ.,
dissenting).
207. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
208. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 883 (1995).
209. 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
210. See infra notes 280-357 and accompanying text.
211. See itfra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
A. Smith v. General Scanning, Inc."2
In Smith, a reduction in force precipitated the termination of a sixty-
year-old sales engineer.2 3 The Seventh Circuit found that the petitioner
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did
not effectively rebut the employer's proffered legitimate business reasons
for selecting him for termination.214 Additionally, sales in petitioner's
region (in which he was the sole sales engineer) were down 21.6% com-
pared to a decrease of 13.5% nationally."' In light of escalating sales de-
partment expenses, a new vice-president for marketing decided to reor-
ganize by eliminating that office along with petitioner's position."' The
court interpreted the above grounds as lawful, refusing to "second-guess"
the employer. 7
The court's opinion contained strong language, albeit dicta, concerning
the irrelevance of after-acquired evidence of the petitioner's application
fraud."8 The court of appeals faulted the district court's focus on
petitioner's qualifications (or absence of credentials) in light of his false
declaration of bachelor's and master's degrees in mechanical engineer-
ing."' In addressing the question of liability, the court noted: "At issue
is the lawfulness of Smith's termination. His resume fraud clearly had
nothing to do with that .... Whether GSI discriminated against Smith
must be decided solely with respect to the reason given for his dis-
charge .... His resume fraud is, for this purpose, irrelevant."
212. 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989).
213. Id. at 1316.
214. Id. at 1320-21. The petitioner's seniority was less than that of the retained em-
ployees and his performance evaluations were also less favorable. Id.
215. Id. at 1320.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1321.
218. Id. at 1319-20.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1319. The Seventh Circuit reflected that the evidence of application fraud
would be relevant at the relief stage, indicating that an employee who committed a
dischargeable offense should not be reinstated and that backpay should not accumu-
late after the discovery of the fraud. Id. at 1319 n.2. This dicta was cited in support
of the Seventh Circuit's later and broader adoption of the Summers rationale. See
Washington v., Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1992); iqfra notes 227-45
and accompanying text. It should be noted that Smith's job description stated a re-
quirement of a Bachelor of Science that he did not possess. Smith, 876 F.2d at 1319.
Since Smith was employed in sales, he would not have been subject to the rigorous
certification requirements of a practicing professional engineer, and thus his false
credentials were not revealed until the employment litigation. See id, at 1319-20.
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B. Reed v. Amax Coal Co."
In a case decided just one month before Washington v. Lake County,
the Seventh Circuit granted summary judgment to the defendant employ-
er because the petitioner did not make out a prima facie case of race
discrimination.222 The court previously refused to grant summary
judgment on the basis of after-acquired evidence indicating that the peti-
tioner lied on his employment application because the employer never
proved that it "would have fired" the petitioner for that misconduct.'
The Seventh Circuit asserted that the Summers rule required this proof,
as opposed to establishing that the defendant employer "could have
fired" the petitioner due to the falsification of his application.'4 The
"would have fired" standard may have been met with evidence estab-
lished by the employer "that other employees were fired in similar cir-
cumstances."22,5 The court noted that this standard exists "to prevent
employers from avoiding Title VII liability by pointing to minor rule viola-
tions which may technically subject the employee to dismissal but would
not, in fact, result in discharge." '
C. Washington v. Lake County
In Washington, decided one month after Reed, the Seventh Circuit
noted that it had yet to "squarely" adopt the Summers rationale, despite
its references to Summers in both Smith v. General Scanning, Inc. and
Powers v. Chicago Transit Authority.' In Washington, the plaintiff
Washington was hired in 1986 as a jailer at the Lake County Sheriffs
Department where he was terminated after less than one year due to
numerous violations of department policy, including insubordination and
breaches of jail security.' Washington's letter of termination also re-
221. 971 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1992).
222. Id. at 1299.
223. Id. at 1298. The court analyzed the case using the Summers rationale, even
though it' distinguished the facts from those in Reed and found that defendant failed




227. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
228. Washington, 969 F.2d at 253 (citing Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d
1315 (7th Cir. 1989) and Powers v. Chicago Transit Auth., 890 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th
Cir. 1989)).
229. Id. at 251-52.
ferred to his recent arrest for criminal sexual assault as bringing discred-
it upon the department.' ° Despite these assertions, petitioner received
positive performance appraisals, labeling him as either "excellent" or
"proficient" rather than merely "adequate" or "marginal." "
When Washington contested his discharge, it came to light that he lied
on his employment application by indicating that he had no criminal
convictions of a serious nature when in fact he pled guilty to criminal
trespass in 1974 and in 1981 had been convicted of a separate third-de-
gree assault.2" The employment application clearly stated that the ap-
plicant understood that "'if any misrepresentation has been made... em-
ployment [may be] terminated immediately. '"' No other cases of appli-
cation fraud had previously been detected or acted upon by the employ-
er. 2U
The district court in Washington granted summary judgment to the
defendants based upon the rationale of Summers.' The Seventh Cir-
cuit reviewed the after-acquired evidence case precedent within the cir-
cuit, pointing out the important distinction between two hypothetical
questions: whether the employer would have hired an applicant as com-
pared to whether an employer would have fired an incumbent employee
(based upon after-acquired evidence of application fraud or misconduct
on the job).' The court distinguished Washington's application fraud
from the "gross misconduct on the job" involved in Summers, and fur-
ther discounted the "masquerading doctor" hypothetical from Summers
as "similarly unhelpful, since it is obvious that a 'doctor' without a li-
cense would never be hired and also would be fired immediately upon
discovery of this fact. "n7
The Washington court next analogized a mixed-motive discharge case
to a case in which the employer introduced after-acquired evidence to
defend an employment discrimination case.' The court stated that in
230. Id. at 252. The charge of criminal sexual assault was dropped shortly
thereafter. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 251-52.
233. Id. at 252. The court noted that the "may be" terminated language in the appli-
cation form did not establish that the same decision would have been made, which is
the appropriate standard under Summers. Id. at 257 n.7. The form also informed
applicants that "[a] conviction record is not an automatic bar to employment and the
nature, recency, and disposition of an offense will be considered only as it relates to
the job for which you are applying." Id. at 252.
234. Id. This is not unusual because employers frequently do not detect such appli-
cation irregularities until they seek to defend an employment discrimination charge.
235. Id. (citing Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988)).
236. Id. at 253.
237. Id. at 254.
238. Id. at 255; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (discussing
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both cases "the issue... is whether the plaintiff has actually been in-
jured, and the court is required to undergo a hypothetical inquiry as to
what the company would have done under different circumstances. " '
According to the Washington court, both mixed-motive and after-ac-
quired evidence cases require the employer to prove that it would have
fired the plaintiff anyway, and thus the "same evidentiary framework
is... appropriate."' The Seventh Circuit refused to bar relief to a peti-
tioner because of that petitioner's application fraud, although the court
admitted that this "may have some merit if the employment decision
challenged is the refusal to hire."" Despite the court's acknowledgment
that, in mixed-motive cases, the "temporal focus is on the time of the
adverse employment decision," the Seventh Circuit approved the same
decision absent the unlawful reason standard for either scenario. u2
The Washington court summarized the key issue presented as "wheth-
er the employer, acting in a race-neutral fashion, would have fired the
employee upon discovery of the misrepresentation, not whether the em-
ployer would have hired the employee had it known the truth."' In
light of the facts, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defen-
dant because the court asserted that the defendant would have terminat-
ed Washington had it known of his convictions.' Thus, the Seventh
Circuit allowed the Summers doctrine to carry the day. The Seventh
Circuit's defection to the opposite rule is discussed in part VII of this
article.'
mixed-motive discharge). The Washington court also noted that an employer may be
less likely to terminate an employee who "has proven himself to be capable" despite
later-discovered information regarding his application fraud, whereas an individual
whose misrepresentations are discovered prior to hire would be in a less advanta-
geous position and would less likely be hired. See Washington, 969 F.2d at 254.
239. Washington, 969 F.2d at 255.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 256.
242. Id. The court supported this analysis by simply asserting that it saw "no rea-
son why this [mixed-motive] approach should not be used in Summers-type cases."
Id.
243. Id. The court specifically assumed, without further consideration, that the ra-
tionale of Summers remained viable despite the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act. Id. at 256 n.6.
244. Id. at 256. The court found that no genuine issue of material fact was raised
on this issue because the petitioner did not produce evidence to rebut the employer's
assertions. Id. at 256-57.
245. See infra notes 301-18 and accompanying text.
V. THE FouRTH CIRCUIT
"Do not deprive me of my age.
I have earned it."
May Sarton,
The Poet and the Donkey (1969)
A. Smallwood v. United Air Lines24
In a pre-Summers decision from the Fourth Circuit involving after-
acquired evidence, the court separated the issue of liability for age dis-
crmination from the issue of the plaintiffs damages.247 Since the plain-
tiff concealed that he was fired for good cause from his former job as a
pilot,m and this fact would have been discovered later in the applica-
tion process anyway, 9 the Fourth Circuit held that the petitioner had
not himself suffered from the defendant's illegal rule of denying employ-
ment to applicants over age thirty-five.' ° This was true because the de-
fendant company established that even without the age discrimination it
would not have hired anyone guilty of such misconduct."
The company's exclusionary hiring rule was not protected by a bona
fide occupational qualification exemption, and thus the court's grant of
injunctive relief against the application of the rule withstood the
defendant's after-the-fact rationale. 2 While the petitioner was disquali-
fied from relief because he would not have been hired anyway, the law-
suit established liability and effectively eliminated future application of
the defendant's discriminatory rule.'
This result, in contrast to many of the cases decided after Summers, at
least resolved the question of whether a statutory violation occurred. In a
246. 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
247. 728 F.2d at 618.
248. Id. at 620-22. The facts revealed that petitioner had, at the former job, claimed
moving expenses for which he knew he was not entitled and had engaged in "delib-
erate deception" to support his false claim. Id at 621-22. He also abused his compa-
ny card to purchase transportation for his children. Id. An impartial board, which the
plaintiff requested pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, upheld the
plaintiffs discharge from his former employer. Id. at 620-22. The court of appeals
adopted facts from the referee's report as it was part of the trial record. See id. at
620-21. The plaintiff did not object to the statements in the report, only to the severi-
ty of the employer's penalty, as upheld by the referee. Id. at 621.
249. Id. at 624, 626.
250. Id. at 625, 627.
251. Id. at 624. The facts regarding the petitioner's prior employment and discharge
would have been discovered during the application process; thus, he would not have
been hired, even without the discriminatory rule. Id. at 626.
252. Id. at 617-18.
253. Id. at 627.
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positive sense, SmaUwood remedied the pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation, but it excluded the plaintiff from enjoying individual relief be-
cause of the after-acquired evidence of his wrongdoing.M Since the
court concluded that Smallwood would not have been hired anyway,m if
one followed the Supreme Court's logic in McKennon,m a plaintiff such
as Smallwood would probably only be entitled to receive backpay for the
period when he would have been hired absent the discriminatory rule
until the date when the evidence of his application fraud would have
been discovered in the course of processing his application."?
While the remedy that would follow here from the McKennon court's
guidance may seem small, the principle enunciated there is truly signifi-
cant. For even where the remedy is nominal, it vindicates the individual's
injury as well as the overriding public policies embodied in the equal
employment opportunity statutes.m
A federal district court decision from within the Ninth Circuit will
conclude the analysis of this line of cases, the precursors and followers
of the Summers doctrine. The following case is of particular interest
because of some factual similarities that it shares with the McKennon
case.
VI. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN ARIZONA,
FROM THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.'
In a case of first impression, a federal district court in the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct should
bar a former employee's discrimination claim when the conduct in ques-
tion would have constituted grounds for discharge if the employer had
been aware of it.2" In O'Day, the plaintiff, a forty-six-year-old engineer,
alleged, inter alia, that his layoff and previous denial of promotion vio-
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 74-105 and accompanying text discussing McKennon. This sup-
poses an inference that the backpay remedy in McKennon that involved a discharge
should also apply to the failure to hire as in SmaUwood.
257. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
258. See generally McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884-85 (discussing broad public policy
purposes behind legislation and role of individual relief).
259. 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992).
260. Id. at 1468, 1470.
lated federal and state statutes prohibiting age discrimination in employ-
ment."1 Two days prior to his layoff, O'Day secretly extracted his confi-
dential personnel file from his supervisor's desk and photocopied por-
tions, which he then removed from the premises.
Within O'Day's personnel file were individual engineer's rankings ("to-
tems") that became the basis for numerous employment decisions.2"
O'Day maintained that he showed the totems to his co-worker to "warn
him of his low ranking."2" Nonetheless, plaintiffs conduct, when dis-
covered during a deposition by defendant employer, was deemed a "di-
rect violation" of company rules.2" The rules in question were classified
under "Group I" infractions, which are "extremely serious and... nor-
mally result in discharge unless extenuating circumstances are pres-
ent. "266
Thus, the company converted O'Day's "layoff" status to a termination
after its discovery of his misconduct.267 The employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment based upon the after-acquired evidence doctrine was
granted. '  The district court relied upon Summers, 2' the precedent-
setting case from the Tenth Circuit.270 The evidence that the employer
discovered in Summers while preparing to defend itself against the
plaintiffs charges of employment discrimination involved much more
pervasive misconduct than that involved in O'Day.27" ' In Summers, the
261. Id. at 1467. O'Day had filed a complaint with the EEOC 10 days prior to his
layoff and filed a second charge three months later. Id. He filed a private lawsuit




265. Id. at 1468.
266. Id. at 1468 n.1. The company handbook detailed the rules in question as pro-
hibiting "deliberate or negligent destruction, damage or misuse of Company property
or property of others" and theft or unauthorized removal from premises of company
property or property of others." Id. The purpose of the company rules was stated in
the preamble:
In order to ensure a safe, orderly, and productive work environment and pro-
tect the rights of all employees, the Company has established rules of per-
sonal conduct. Infractions requiring corrective action are described below.
The Company, [sic] must reserve the right to take corrective action for unac-
ceptable conduct not specifically described.
Id.
267. Id. at 1468.
268. Id. at 1470.
269. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
270. See id.
271. See O'Day, 784 F. Supp. at 1468. The misconduct in the McKennon case could
be more easily grouped with that in O'Day than with that in Summers. See
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 540-41 (6th Cir. 1993),
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falsification of over 150 records by a field claims representative of an
automobile insurance company must surely be seen as egregious activity
that directly related to the viability of the business, even if the employer
expressly stated other reasons for the termination."7
The O'Day court specified that for an employer to make use of the
after-acquired evidence doctrine, it must prove that the employee would
have been discharged for the misconduct.' The court explained that
O'Day would have been fired for his misconduct anyway, and his acts
were not classified as protected activity under the "opposition clause" of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.274 Thus, the court found
that no reasonable jury would find O'Day's conduct reasonable. 5
The facts and allegations in O'Day are strikingly similar to those in
McKennon."7" Certainly in future cases like O'Day, the federal courts,
following the McKennon precedent, will merely allow such evidence of
wrongdoing to affect the remedy once the employer's liability for dis-
crimination is established.' The remedy of reinstatement will be barred
rev'd and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). However, because McKennon showed the
confidential documents to her husband, rather than to a co-worker, there seemed to
be less impact upon the workplace in McKennon than in O'Day..
272. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 702-03.
273. O'Day, 784 F. Supp. at 1468. This burden was met by evidence of direct viola-
tion of a company policy that the employee handbook set out as an "extremely seri-
ous" infraction that would "normally result in discharge." Id. & n.l. The court was
not convinced that a material issue of fact remained to prevent the motion for sum-
mary judgment, despite plaintiffs effort to establish that the defendant's firing practic-
es were inconsistent Id. at 1469. This ruling has been questioned by at least one
commentator. See Parker, supra note 23, at 438 (discussing that written policies not
always consistently enforced).
274. O'Day, 784 F. Supp. at 1469; see 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988). The district court
noted that "opposition" must be lawful and "reasonable in light of the employer's
interest in maintaining a harmonious and efficient operation." O'Day, 784 F. Supp. at
1469-70 (citations omitted).
275. O'Day, 784 F. Supp. at 1470.
276. See supra notes 2-11, 24-28 and accompanying text discussing facts in
McKennoL The misconduct in both cases occurred immediately preceding the
employee's termination, so that arguably there was a nexus between the alleged dis-
crimination and the wrongdoing of the plaintiffs in both cases.
277. See McKennon v. Nashville Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct 879 (1995). A later case
decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused the introduction of after-ac-
quired evidence by a defendant in an employment discrimination case because the
issue was raised for the first time on appeal. EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d
891, 900-02 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, the defendant failed to reserve the issue which
would require factual as well as legal development. Id. at 901. In dicta, the court
noted that "if we were to decide this issue, it would be inequitable to hold that af-
if the employer proves that it would have terminated the plaintiff anyway
because of the wrongdoing.7 ' The plaintiffs right to backpay would
generally be curtailed as of the date of discovery of the wrongdoing."
VII. AFrER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOES NOT BAR LIABILITY FOR
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. The Eleventh Circuit Leads the Charge
1. Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.20
A case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit generated a trend
away from the Summers doctrine."l In Wallace v. Dunn Construction
Co., a divided panel held that evidence of an employee's application
fraud, discovered by the employer in the course of defending an employ-
ment discrimination lawsuit, may not be used by that employer as an af-
firmative defense to Title VII liability.' The Eleventh Circuit took issue
ter-acqured evidence of misrepresentations in a job application should preclude an
otherwise successful plaintiff from recovering damages." Id. While not a binding
statement of precedent, this decision indicates that the Ninth Circuit appeared to be
clearly moving away from the Summers doctrine even before the Supreme Court's
McKennon decision.
278. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
279. Id. But cf. i7ifra notes 319-57 and accompanying text discussing backpay to
date of judgment as remedy in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3rd
Cir. 1994), judgment vacated and case remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995), oj'd in
part and rev'd in part, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18611 (10th Cir. July 20, 1995) (affirm-
ing opinion but limiting backpay to date of discovery absent exceptional circumstanc-
es in light of McKennon's binding precedent). The extension of backpay to the date
of judgment as in MardeU makes good sense in some respects because the date of
discovery of the wrongdoing has no true significance to the calculation of relief.
Rather, the date of when after-acquired evidence would have been discovered absent
the defendant's discrimination, while nebulous to establish, would be a more accurate
measure of a plaintiffs legally supportable relief. See also irfra notes 280-300 and
accompanying text, discussing Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir.
1992), vacated and reh'g granted, 32 F.3d 1489 (lth Cir. 1994), affd in part, rev'd
and remanded in part, 62 F.3d 374 (lth Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit initially
rebelled against the termination of backpay as of the date of discovery of the after-
acquired evidence because it places the member of a protected class in a worse
position than if she were not a victim of discrimination. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at
1182.
280. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated and reh'g granted, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th
Cir. 1994), affd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995).
281. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992). As will be discussed, the First Circuit decided
an earlier after-acquired evidence discrimination case, coming to much the same con-
clusion as the Wallace and McKennon Supreme Court decisions in a union hiring hall
context See Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d
396 (1st Cir. 1990); infra notes 358-78 and accompanying text discussing Sabree.
282. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1176-77, 1181. The allegations with respect to plaintiff-
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with Summers' use of after-acquired evidence as a basis for avoidance of
liability.' The court reasoned that this rule permits the defendant to
prove "that it would have discharged the plaintiff absent any unlawful
motives if it had possessed full knowledge of the circumstances existing
at the time of the discharge."'m According to the court, such a rule "ig-
nores the lapse of time" and "clashes with the Mt. Healthy principle...
that the plaintiff should be left in no worse a position than if she had not
been a member of a protected class or engaged in protected opposition
to an unlawful employment practice."'
The Wallace court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins confirmed that Mt. Healthy's principles may be
extended to Title VII mixed-motive cases if the plaintiff proves "that an
impermissible criterion was a 'substantial factor' in the adverse employ-
ment decision, then the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision
would actually have been made absent an unlawful motive."'m The Elev-
enth Circuit objected to the use of a legitimate motive discovered after
the unlawful act. 7 The court reasoned that the "law governing after-ac-
quired evidence... should not replicate the law applicable to mixed
motives. " '
appellee Joyce Neil also included violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 206(d)(1), 215 (a)(2) (West 1978), and tort claims under state law. Wallace, 968
F.2d at 1176.
283. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1178-79. See generally William M. Muth, Jr., Note, The
After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Tile VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by
Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 72 NEB. L. REV. 330, 343-48 (1993) (explaining the
court's decision in Wallace).
284. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1178.
285. Id. at 1179 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 285-86 (1977)). The plaintiff objected inter alia, to (alleged) sexual harassment
and equal pay violations and the causes of action relating to her discharge included
retaliation under both Title V11 and the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 1176. The Eleventh
Circuit noted that the plaintiff in Summers was placed "in a worse position than if
he had not been a member of a protected class . . . [because he] would have re-
mained employed for at least some period of time after he was actually discharged."
Id. at 1179-80.
286. Id. at 1180 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261, 276 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). But see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No. 102-166, 107,
105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991) (amending Title VII to limit Price Waterhouse holding).
287. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180.
288. Id. at 1181.
According to the Wallace decision, "after-acquired evidence is relevant
to the relief due a successful Title VII plaintiff."' The court recom-
mended a case-by-case determination of the remedies and advised that
when the after-acquired evidence would independently cause a discharge,
then neither reinstatement nor front pay would be ordered.'m The Elev-
enth Circuit would not terminate the backpay period upon the discovery
of the after-acquired evidence, however, preferring to require the employ-
er to establish "that it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence
prior to what would otherwise be the end of the backpay period in the
absence of the allegedly unlawful acts and [the] litigation.""' This ap-
proach places the victim "in no worse a position" than if she had not
been discriminated against.'
The facts in Wallace clearly indicated that the plaintiff Neil would
never have been hired if she had told the truth on her application, and
that she would have been fired once the company became aware of her
false application.' Prospective remedies of reinstatement, front pay,
and injunctive relief were consequently unavailable to plaintiff under
both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.' The Eleventh Circuit refused to
grant summary judgment on the question of when backpay and other
damages should be cut off.2" The dissenting Judge Godbold would have
dismissed the suit on the basis of a lack of standing since the plaintiff's
fraudulent employment application was the reason why she obtained the
position.'m
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the above-discussed panel opinion and
ordered a rehearing en banc.27 The vacated opinion has greatly influ-
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1182.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1184.
294. Id. Such remedies were cut off as a matter of law on Neil's federal claims. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1185 (Godbold, J., dissenting). Judge Godbold viewed the plaintiff as a
"false claimant" and would distinguish false application cases from those cases in
which an employee rightfully obtained employment, but later engaged in wrongdoing
once the employee was "rightfully a member of the workforce." Id. at 1188-89
(Godbold, J., dissenting).
297. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994). The en banc deci-
sion in Wallace was recently rendered. 63 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995). The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judg-
ment to the employer with respect to front pay, reinstatement, and injunctive relief
because the employer sufficiently demonstrated that the plaintiff would have been
fired anyway when the misrepresentation came to light. Id. at 380-81. The district
court's denial of summary judgment as to backpay, unpaid wages and liquidated dam-
ages was affirmed because "the after-acquired evidence does not bar recovery, but
merely affects the remedy." Id. at 381. The Eleventh Circuit cited McKennon's guid-
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enced this area of the law. Wallace set forth the reasons why the Sum-
mers doctrine is incorrect in a manner that has since been followed in
other cases, including McKennon.98 In addition, Wallace provides
broader relief than that sanctioned by the Seventh Circuit's turnaround
case, Kristufek, which will be discussed next.2" Furthermore, the Third
Circuit in Mardell adopted a backpay formula that aligns with
Wallace.m
B. The Seventh Circuit Abandons the Summers Doctrine
1. Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co."°
The most recent after-acquired evidence case from the Seventh Circuit
involved a pair of discharges in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.' Mary McPherson, a fifty-nine-year-old executive sec-
retary to the president, with forty years of service to the company, was
terminated in 1986 because the president at that time preferred a young
secretary.' Less than two months later, Arthur Kristufek, the Director
of Employee and Community Relations, who had opposed the president's
planned replacement of McPherson, also was terminated.' In the
course of the litigation, Kristufek admitted that he overstated his educa-
tional credentials when he interviewed for his position.'
In light of this after-acquired information, the district court entered
ance that the usual rule on backpay is to calculate it "'from the date of unlawful
discharge to the date the new information was discovered . . [but that] . . . the
court can consider taking into further account extraordinary equitable circumstances.'"
Id. at 380 (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 886
(1995)).
298. McKennon v. Nashville Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995).
299. See infra notes 301-18 discussing Kristufek.
300. See infra notes 319-57 and accompanying text discussing MardeU.
301. 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
302. Id. at 365; see 29 U.S.C. § 621-624 (1988).
303. Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 366-67. The president in question was new to the com-
pany as of 1984. Id. at 366.
304. Id, Kristufek was 57 years old at the time of his termination. Id.
305. Id. at 366. Kristufek was employed for five years at the defendant company,
during which time his education claims were never verified. Id. Kristufek testified
that his relationship with the president deteriorated after he counseled against termi-
nating McPherson and that the president dismissed many prospective replacements
based upon their age, or criteria that correlated with age, such as school graduation
date. Id. at 367.
judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). M The
court of appeals, however, stated that it could not "apply discrimination
law so forthrightly, regardless of the admitted fraud. " " The court noted
that the district court relied upon Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.,"
which the appellate court cited with its approval as having made clear
"that the only issue is the lawfulness of the termination for the reasons
given."' Just as in Kristufek, the Smith case involved resume fraud
that was not related to the reasons proffered by the defendant in support
of its decision to discharge." ' In both instances, the Kristufek opinion
noted that "[tihe after discovered alternate reason comes too late."'
Distinguishing the facts in Summers, where the employer knew of
some of the later-discovered misconduct even though it asserted other
reasons for the termination, the court refused to bar backpay relief to
Kristufek.1 2 In Kristufek, the petitioner's "one time falsification was not
known until after discharge" so it did not influence the defendant's deci-
sion, nor did the defendant prove that it would have fired him absent his
protected conduct in protesting McPherson's discriminating discharge."3
The Seventh Circuit thus deemed it error that the district court granted
JNOV to the employer based upon the after-acquired evidence of
petitioner's false resume."'
Nonetheless, the court, in its remand, directed that backpay would be
cut off from the date when the fraud was discovered."5 The court justi-
fied this decision by simply stating that it saw "nothing to be gained by
further penalizing [the employer] after this resume fraud came to
306. Id. at 369.
307. Id.
308. 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text
discussing Smith.
309. Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 369 (citing Smith, 876 F.2d at 1319). The court in
Kristufek reaffirmed the concept that the sole issue in a discriminatory discharge
case are the reasons or "known circumstances" that led to the discharge. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. (citing Smith, 876 F.2d at 1319). The Kristufek court stated that this re-
mained the court's view of the law. Id.
312. Id. (citing Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988)); see supra notes 155-73 and accompanying text. In Summers, the employer
warned petitioner that future falsifications could lead to his discharge, yet further
violations occurred. 864 F.2d at 702. The employer eventually placed the petitioner on
probation for two weeks without pay prior to his eventual discharge. See Kristfek,
985 F.2d at 369-70 (discussing continuing extensive misconduct of petitioner in Sum-
mers and why that rule is inapplicable to the Kristufek case).
313. Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 370.
314. Id. The jury made its determination despite the false resume information, and
the appellate court found that absent an adequate showing by the employer that the
petitioner would have been fired, it was error to eradicate the jury's verdict Id.
315. Id. at 371.
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light.""6 It would seem that this reduction in backpay should have been
justified by proof that Kristufek would have been terminated because of
his resume fraud. 17 The court could have proceeded a step further in
terms of protecting employees from retaliatory discharges and required
that the employer prove that it would have discovered the resume fraud
even without the litigation and, assuming that fraud warranted discharge,
permitted backpay up until the point when the fraud would have been
discovered absent defendant's discrimination.31 Such a scheme would
accord with the remedy provided in the recent decision from the Third
Circuit, discussed next.
C. The Third Circuit Encourages More Complete Relief as in Wallace
1. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.3"
Judge Edward Becker authored a strong opinion delineating the divi-
sion among the circuits on the issue of the effect of after-acquired evi-
dence in employment discrimination cases." ° In addressing what has
been characterized as "one of the most contentious issues in employment
discrimination law today,"" the Third Circuit criticized the Tenth
Circuit's Summers rule and its application in the Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits.' Following the lead of the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace,
the Third Circuit also provided backpay to the date of judgment rather
316. Id
317. See id. at 370.
318. Such a prerequisite would square with the Wallace and MardelU remedies, see
supra notes 280-300 and accompanying text discussing Wallace; infra notes 319-57
and accompanying text discussing Mardell, but is not required by the Supreme Court
in McKennon, see supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text. The court in Kristufek
determined that Kristufek's falsifications "were not of a critical nature" and noted
that he functioned well without the missing degree which did not appear to be a job
prerequisite. Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 370.
319. 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995),
off d original opinion in large part, vacated in part, (the portion on backpay in
light of McKennon), 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18611 (10th Cir. July 20, 1995).
320. 31 F.3d at 1222-40.
321. Employee Wrongdoing Doesn't Immunize Employers from Employment Bias
Charges, Third Circuit Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 150, at D3 (Aug. 8, 1994).
322. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1226-27.
than to the date when the employer discovered the evidence of a prior
obstacle to employment.'
After-acquired evidence of deceit or misconduct was characterized as
constituting lesser claims of the employer that, while not admissible at
the liability stage, could be asserted and considered at the remedies
stage. 2' In contrast, the protection afforded employees against
workplace discrimination is clearly a federal right that public policy dic-
tates should not be ignored or submerged, even when knowledge of mis-
conduct or shortcomings later come to light.' The employer should
not "get off scot-free despite its blameworthy conduct.""6
The Third Circuit emphasized a point often glossed over by the circuits
following the Summers rule, that the employer "may never have discov-
ered the evidence" if it were not for the legal proceedings engendered by
the employer's illegal conduct. 7 This, and the overriding public interest
in restoring the victim to the position that he or she would have been in
absent discrimination, resulted in the court's insistence that the after-ac-
quired evidence would not affect liability but would be admissible to
guide the remedy.' s
The MardeU case involved the differential treatment and termination of
a fifty-two-year-old woman who was an accomplished life insurance
agent with Prudential Life Insurance Company.' She was recruited by
defendant Harleysville where she found herself not only in the ignomini-
ous position of being the first employee to be placed on probation, but
also subject to dismissal for failure to meet monthly sales quotas.m Sig-
nificantly, her male peers commonly failed to meet the standards that the
employer set for the plaintiff.' After two years, Mardell was discharged
and replaced by a forty-year-old male."
Disparate treatment of the plaintiff was also evidenced by her
supervisor's comments and attitudes that indicated both gender and age
323. Id.
324. Id, at 1238.
325. See id. at 1234-37 (discussing statutory purposes and how non-liability under-
mines same). "[T]o maintain that a victim of employment discrimination has suffered
no injury is to deprecate the federal right transgressed and to heap insult... upon
injury." Id. at 1232.
326. Id. at 1237.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1238-40 (discussing the relevance of employee misconduct to relief and
that after-acquired evidence may bar equitable remedy like reinstatement).
329. Id. at 1222-23.
330. Id. at 1223.
331. Id.
332. Id
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bias.' He had higher expectations of the plaintiff than of her male
peers, making remarks reflecting his regret that she "'wasn't one of the
boys'" and that he "'would never have another female regional direc-
tor.'"
The after-acquired evidence against plaintiff involved application re-
sume fraud.' In essence, Mardell represented that she had a B.S. de-
gree when she had two courses left to complete.' She exaggerated her
professional experience in terms of duties and by indicating that some
experiences were remunerated that were not. 7 Also, the petitioner mis-
stated the dates of performance.' All of these items substantially pre-
dated plaintiffs hiring by the defendant since, in the interim, she had
spent eleven years with Prudential.' Additionally, the defendant did
not require a college degree for the position in question, stating that it
would hire the "'mental equivalent' of a college graduate."' Thus, the
after-acquired evidence against Mardell did not seem to conclusively
establish that she would not have been hired or would have been fired
had the employer known of her misrepresentations, although the employ-
er provided testimony regarding negative impact that the fraud would
have had on her employment."'
The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment because Mardell "suffered no legally cognizable injury."' The
333. Id.
334. Id. Other objectionable remarks by plaintiffs supervisor included that her job
was not one "'for a woman'"; that many of her agents would consider her "'a wife'";
that he expressed that she "'just wanted to stay home and watch the soaps'"; and
"'should be home playing with [her] grandchildren.'" Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. She indicated that she received her degree in 1977, but it was not fully
earned until she completed five credits in 1992. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.,
854 F. Supp. 378, 381 (W.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 31 F.3d 1221 (1994), and vacated, 115
S. Ct. 1397 (1995), affd in part and vacated in part, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18611
(10th Cir July 20, 1995).
337. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1223-24.
338. Id. at 1224.
339. Id. at 1223.
340. id.
341. See id. at 1224. The court also noted that the employer declared a policy
against misrepresentation on its application form. Id.
342. Id. The district court followed the Sixth Circuit's approach. Mardell v.
Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 854 F. Supp. 378, 380 (W.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 31 F.3d 1221
(1994), and vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995), afd in part and vacated in part, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 18611 (10th Cir July 20, 1995).
Third Circuit vacated the district court's order that granted summary
judgment to the defendant and remanded the case because it deemed the
after-acquired evidence irrelevant at the liability stage of the case.'
The court in Mardell disposed of the argument that after-acquired evi-
dence could provide a "legitimate" reason for the contested discharge on
the same basis as in Wallace, that the later-discovered reason was non-
existent when the decision was made.'
The Mardell court noted the Supreme Court's guidance from the Price
Waterhouse case "that in a mixed-motives case the employers could rely
only on a legitimate motive it held at the time of the adverse employ-
ment decision."5 The court determined that the relevant inquiry was
the "employer's subjective assessment of the plaintiffs qualifications, not
the plaintiffs objective ones if unknown to the employer."' The Third
Circuit found that the plaintiff had standing to sue based upon the lan-
guage and intent of the federal statutes.4 7 The 1991 Civil Rights Act
more than reinforced this concept because the statute reaches beyond
the result in Price Waterhouse to ensure that a plaintiff "is entitled to
some relief even if the employer actually would have taken the same
action at the same time absent any invidious motive."'
The Mardell opinion envisions a right to be free from discriminatory
treatment on the job as separate from an employee's entitlement to the
job. 9 The discriminatory treatment "results... in a significant injury to
the victim's dignity and a demoralizing impairment of his or her self-es-
teem."
The misconduct or application fraud of an employee does not excuse
the employer's discriminatory actions, for there is an overriding public
interest in enforcing these federal laws."' The Third Circuit refers to
343. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1228, 1240.
344. Id. at 1228 (citing Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d at 1174, 1179 (9th
Cir. 1992) (discussing problem with Summers rule is that it ignores lapse of time)).
345. Id. at 1229 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion)).
346. Id. at 1230 & n.16 (citations omitted).
347. Id. at 1231-32.
348. Id. at 1232 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105
Stat. 1075-76, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1994)). Of
course, in after-acquired evidence cases, the damaging information is not known to
the employer at the time of the discriminatory action. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
provides for compensatory damages under Title VII for "emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary
losses." Id. at 1233 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(3) (Supp. 1994)).
349. Id. at 1233. The court noted that "at-will" employees have no "property right"
in their jobs and yet may pursue a federal discrimination claim. Id. at 1233.
350. Id. at 1232-33.
351. Id. at 1233-34.
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the employer's interests as "purely private state rights" whereas the em-
ployee exerts "quasi-public federal" rights."
The after-acquired evidence, while admissible at the remedies stage,
must be handled carefully so as not to "affect the liability verdict.'n
The Mardell court sets forth guidance for the district court on the poten-
tial remedy, including that the "normal rule" for backpay to the date of
judgment should generally be used to maximize its deterrent effect.'
The employer could use the after-acquired evidence to curtail the accu-
mulating backpay liability at a date prior to the date of judgment if it
could prove that it would have discovered the evidence anyway (without
the lawsuit) or if it did discover the evidence independently of the law-
suit engendered by the discrimination.' The employer would also need
to establish that the innocently discovered after-acquired evidence would
have led to the same decision.' The court in Mardell emphasized the
need to preserve management's traditional prerogatives and free choice
as long as that choice does not violate the anti-discrimination stat-
utes.5
7
D. The First Circuit's Earlier Accord in a Related Context
1. Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners Local No. 338
The First Circuit's foray into the arena of after-acquired evidence oc-
curred in a union hiring hall setting.' The case, heard before a panel
that included then Chief Judge Breyer, who is now a United States Su-
preme Court Justice, dealt with a series of allegedly discriminatory inter-
352. Id. at 1234.
353. Id. at 1238.
354. Id. at 1239. The Third Circuit cited, inter alia, Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co.,
968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 1992), for this proposition. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1239. Be-
cause this strong language on remedies differed from the Supreme Court's more mod-
erate guidance in McKennon, the Court vacated and remanded the case back to the
Third Circuit After-Acquired Evidence, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at A-2 (March
28, 1995). Thereafter, the Third Circuit restricted its direction on backpay in light of
McKennon. Mardell, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18611 (10th Cir. July 20, 1995).
355. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1240.
356. Id. Generally, this would be a termination decision and the court made clear
that reinstatement may be barred based upon after-acquired evidence. Id.
357. Id.
358. 921 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1990).
359. Id.
actions between the petitioner Sabree, a black male, and Local 33 of the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Americas Only the
most recent allegation was not barred by the statute of limitations, but
the other allegations, which stretched back fourteen years, while not the
subject of relief,"' were referred to by the court as "circumstantial evi-
dence of discrimination." '
In Sabree, the issue of after-acquired'evidence arose because of a un-
ion district council by-law that restricted transfers within the council . '
At the time of Sabree's third and final attempt to join Local 33 without
success, Sabree was a member of another local within the district.' In
fact, after its second rejection of Sabree, Local 33 advised him to transfer
into another local within the district, thus setting him up for his future
problem with the district council by-law.'
Two years after joining the other local union, Sabree sought once
again to transfer into Local 33 and was rejected without any inquiry or
discussion about his history as a union member.' Thereafter, the de-
fendant sought to defend against Sabree's discrimination complaint with
its after-acquired knowledge that Sabree would not have qualified for
transfer because of his pre-existing membership in another union local
within the district. 7
The First Circuit found that at the time of Sabree's final attempt to
transfer, the by-law was not mentioned and Local 33 did not know that
the petitioner was a member of another local within the district coun-
cil.' Thus, it was not possible for these considerations to preclude the
petitioner's establishment of a prima facie case of race discrimination, as
the district court had held.'
The First Circuit's opinion supported the principle of causation, reflect-
ing that the employer's motivating "reasons" for an employment decision
360. Id. at 397-98.
361. Id. at 405.
362. Id. at 404. The court refused to consider these earlier separate allegations as a
continuing violation because there was "no substantial relationship between [them]."
Id. at 402. The plaintiff admitted that he thought he was being discriminated against
throughout the long period of time in question, and thus the court characterized him
as a "knowing plaintiff' who had "an obligation to file promptly or lose his claim."
Id.
363. Id. at 398.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. id. Such a discussion would have related to petitioner's disqualification from
intra-council transfer. Id.
367. Id. at 402-04.
368. Id. at 402.
369. Id. at 404.
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must be known or evident at the "'actual moment of the event. ' "37 ° The
court recommended taking "a snapshot" of the moment of the challenged
employment decision, and refused to acquiesce to invention of "post hoc
rationalization."37' As in the Price Waterhouse case, the key to the moti-
vation is in the defendant's mental state at the time the employment
decision was made. 2 Thus, since the by-law was only "unearthed" dur-
ing discovery, it could not have been a motivating factor in the
defendant's decision.
3 73
While the by-law could not prevent liability, the court determined that
it could reduce the damages if the defendant established that Sabree's
prior membership within the district council would have been discovered
and that this fact would then have legitimately barred his transfer."
This outcome is essentially in agreement with the later decisions of the
Eleventh Circuit in Wallace'75 and its progeny, including the Supreme
Court's decision in McKennon.3 71 Just as in Wallace and McKennon,
Sabree bifurcated the issues of liability and remedy and did not permit
the after-acquired evidence to bar plaintiffs right to prove the alleged
discrimination. Sabree explicitly depended upon the temporal rule of
causation from Price Waterhouse" for its holding that the defendant's
after-the-fact evidence may reduce the damages but not prevent liabili-
ty.37
8
The Sabree decision squarely placed the First Circuit within the group
of courts that refuse to allow after-acquired evidence to protect a defen-
dant from liability for employment discrimination. The case is also of
historical importance because it predates Wallace, which is generally
credited as the primary precedent countering the Summers doctrine. It is
370. Id. at 403 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989)).
371. Id. at 404.
372. Id. at 403 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 24041).
373. Id. at 404.
374. Id. at 405.
375. See supra notes 280-300 and accompanying text discussing Walace, see also
Robert J. Gregory, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases: Should the Guilty Employer Go Free?, 9 LAB. LAw. 43, 46 & n.21, 53 &
n.59 (1993) (discussing Sabree).
376. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). It is of
interest that the only decision within this "camp" that apparently cited Sabree in
support of its own opinion was Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221,
1230 n.16 (3d Cir. 1994).
377. Sabree, 921 F.2d at 403 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-
41).
378. Id.
probable that Sabree is often overlooked as precedent because the facts
of the case relate more to union by-laws than to traditional issues of
application fraud or employee wrongdoing.
VIII. DETERMINING THE REMEDY N FUTURE AFrER-ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE CASES
A. Related Cases: Balancing the Interests of the Parties
Returning to a consideration of the competing interests involved in
after-acquired evidence cases, such that a trial court may balance those
interests and equities at the remedies stage, the McKennon case provides
the primary paradigm. The plaintiffs misconduct in McKennon involved a
breach of confidentiality that occurred just prior to her termination."
The court noted that management has an important interest in the confi-
dentiality of its business records, and the plaintiff violated her duty of
confidentiality to the employer by copying documents in her own self-
interest and then showing them to her husband.' Plaintiff McKennon
asserted as her justification for this misstep that she feared for her
job." Apparently, McKennon was justified in her insecurity as she was
terminated shortly thereafter, although not because of her disloyal con-
duct.'
In a related mixed-motive case, Jefferies v. Harris County Communi-
ty Action Ass'n,' the Fifth Circuit held that an employer's interest in
protecting the confidentiality of its records outweighed an employee's
right to protect her interests by opposing perceived employment discrim-
ination. ' In Jefferies, the plaintiff transmitted confidential personnel
materials to the chair of the personnel committee who was also a mem-
ber of the board of directors.' This unauthorized dissemination of the
confidential personnel action form took place when the plaintiff learned
379. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605-06 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992).
380. See id. at 606; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
381. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 606.
382. Id at 605-06, 608. The defendant learned of McKennon's breach of confidenti-
ality only after termination. Id. at 605-06.
383. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). Jefferies involved allegations on the basis of
race and sex combined. Id. at 1032-35. The Jefferies case was subjected to a partial
remand on several other issues where the district court and court of appeals affirmed
the dismissal of plaintiffs suit. Jefferies v. Harris County Community Ass'n, 693 F.2d
589 (5th Cir. 1982).
384. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1036-37.
385. Id. at 1029.
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that another (black male) employee had already been hired for a pur-
portedly vacant position for which the plaintiff had just applied.'
Jefferies asserted that her misconduct was a protected activity under
the "opposition clause" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 7 The Fifth Cir-
cuit explained that "courts have required that the employee conduct be
reasonable in light of the circumstances." ' The court concluded that
Jefferies did not establish that she had a reasonable belief which would
have justified her actions.' Just as in McKennon, the statutorily pro-
tected right to oppose unlawful practices did not create a right to delve
into management's confidential business records and share them with
others.' °
Whether a plaintiffs wrongdoing involves such a breach of confidenti-
ality or other misconduct, when after-acquired evidence is discovered
during employment litigation, the courts, after McKennon, will permit the
plaintiff to establish its prima facie case of discrimination before decid-
ing whether the offense was grave enough to warrant discharge indepen-
dently. Thereafter, the impact of "an error in judgment committed under
fear of discriminatory discharge" on the record of an "otherwise exem-
plary" employee such as McKennon will be evaluated for its impact upon
the remedy.9 '
A recent Connecticut decision dealing with the issue of after-acquired
evidence in a wrongful termination case set forth the principle that pub-
lic policy disfavors providing future wages or front pay if the employer
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that after-acquired evi-
dence of employee misconduct would have warranted discharge.' This
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1036. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e - 3(a) (1988).
McKennon asserted an analogous opposition defense under the ADFA See McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. grunted, 114
S.Ct 2099 (1994), rev'd and remanded, 115 S.Ct. 879 (1995).
388. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1036-37.
389. Id.
390. See McKennon, 9 F.3d at 543. The Supreme Court's opinion reversing the Sixth
Circuit in McKennon did not mention this specific issue. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at
879. As discussed above, the dissemination of confidential business records amongst
other employees may cause more harm internally than when an employee seeks ad-
vice only from her spouse, as occurred in McKennon. See supra note 9.
391. See Mills, supra note 24, at 1534 (discussing problem with Sixth Circuit's appli-
cation of Summers rule in McKennon).
392. Preston v. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., 647 A.2d 364, 369 (Conn. App.
1994). The complaint alleged claims at common law under both contract and tort
theories. Id. at 366. There were no statutory discrimination claims. Id.
case is of interest because it illustrates the carryover of federal remedial
doctrines from statutory employment discrimination cases to employ-
ment litigation decided under state common law. In Preston v. Phelps
Dodge Copper Products Co., the appellate court ruled that the jury
should have been instructed to determine whether and when the termina-
tion would have occurred, so that damages could be appropriately
adjusted.' The Connecticut court noted that the issue was one of first
impression in Connecticut, but it interpreted federal precedent from the
Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits as allowing after-acquired evidence to
affect relief.'
The after-acquired evidence in the Preston case involved an unusual
incident where plaintiff, due to his dissatisfaction with his employer, put
poison ivy on a toilet seat and stall in the lavatory used by the plant and
personnel managers.' Preston warned three friends not to use that fa-
cility, but failed to warn the plant manager who incurred a severe aller-
gic reaction as a result.' Other evidence in the case established that
plaintiff functioned as a whistleblower with respect to safety issues and
that the "plaintiff was discharged because of his persistent complaints
about safety."397 There was no indication of impropriety on the
plaintiffs part with regard to this latter activity, and he sustained signifi-
cant emotional and economic injuries from the discharge.'
The Connecticut Court of Appeals weighed the circumstances and
concluded that the poison ivy episode was unrelated to Preston's dis-
charge.' Consequently, that misconduct did not change the illegality of
the termination, but the remedy may be reduced "depending on when the
after acquired evidence was discovered and how it would have affected
the employment relationship. "4" With respect to the award of future
earnings, the court placed upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that
"but for the wrongful discharge, he would still be employed and that he
would have remained with his employer for a period of years."' The
393. Id. at 368, 370.
394. Id. at 369 (concluding that after-acquired evidence in statutory employment cas-
es was relevant to relief).
395. Id. at 366.
396. Id.
397. Id. Plaintiffs positions included responsibility for quality assurance and later,
laboratory safety and maintenance. Id. Thus, the complaints in question were within
his job description as well as legal rights in accordance with public policy. See id.
398. Id
399. Id. at 369. The misconduct was not known to defendant until after plaintiffs
discharge. Id. at 366.
400. Id. at 367.
401. Id Thus future earnings may be curtailed if the trier of fact finds that
Preston's employment would have been terminated (anyway) upon discovery of the
after-acquired evidence. Id.
[Vol. 23: 65, 1995] Employment Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
rule of damages derived from breach of contract theory that would place
the nonbreaching party "in the same position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed." "2 The court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine the damage issue."'
After McKennon, in after-acquired evidence cases involving statutory
employment discrimination, once liability is proven, the burden of proof
regarding the cut off of backpay would rest upon the defendant em-
ployer. If the employer establishes that the employee would have been
terminated anyway because of the after-acquired evidence, then backpay
should be awarded up until the date when the evidence would have been
discovered absent the lawsuit, to the date of discovery of the evidence,
or to the date of judgment, depending upon the equities of the case.
B. EEOC Guidance
On July 14, 1992, the EEOC issued guidelines reversing its earlier posi-
tion that after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing could bar rein-
statement and backpay.4° The agency vested with the administration
and enforcement of Title VII and the ADEA moved to reject the strict
Summers rule that after-acquired evidence could bar all liability.'
Rather, such evidence may be used to preclude reinstatement and to al-
ter the measure of damages.' The Seventh Circuit's measure of damag-
es from Kristufek, permitting the date of discovery of the incriminating
402. Id. (citations omitted). This rule is somewhat analogous to that stated as a
guiding principle on remedies in statutory employment discrimination cases, that of
placing the victim of discrimination in the place that he or she would have been in
absent the discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19
(1975) (involving race discrimination suit based on violations of Civil Rights Act of
1964).
403. Preston, 647 A.2d at 370.
404. See EEOC: Revised Enforcement Guide on Recent Developments in Disparate
Treatment Theory, reprinted in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405: 6925-28 (July 7,
1992) [hereinafter, Revised Enforcement Guide]. This 1992 guidance revised the
agency's earlier approach that limited an employee's recovery to attorney's fees. See
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Policy Guidance No. N-915.063, 1991 WL
70108 at *8 (Mar. 7, 1991) [hereinafter, 1991 EEOC Guidance]. The 1991 EEOC
Guidance cited and generally agreed with Summers. Id. at *8-9.
405. See Mills, supra note 24, at 1551 & n.179.
406. See Richard G. Steele, Rethinking the After-Acquired Evidence Defense in Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 243, 274 (1994) (discussing Revised
Enforcement Guide, supra note 404).
evidence to terminate the accumulation of backpay, was endorsed in the
1992 Revised Enforcement Guide.0 7
In a later memorandum to agency attorneys, the EEOC's General
Counsel stated that "[a]fter-acquired evidence is not relevant to liability
because it could not have been a factor in employer decision mak-
ing."408 Accordingly, a plaintiff in an after-acquired evidence case could
be entitled to backpay and compensatory damages up to the date of
discovery, and perhaps to punitive damages if the employer's conduct is
egregious and covered by the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act.4°9
It is noteworthy that the EEOC's position and guidance are not cited in
Wallace, Kristufek, MardeU or in the Supreme Court's McKennon opin-
ion. The amici curiae brief filed by the Justice Department and the
EEOC in McKennon cites the 1992 Revised Enforcement Guidance and
recommends "terminating backpay on the date that after-acquired evi-
dence would have resulted in such a [lawful] discharge." ' Yet the brief
also refers to the Wallace remedy,"' and, in discussing the employer's
burden on its affirmative defense relating to the curtailment of the reme-
dy, the brief states that the employer would:
ordinarily be required to show that other employees, who had not been the ob-
jects of discrimination, had been terminated for similar reasons. Nor should an
employer be able to escape liability for backpay by relying upon evidence of mis-
conduct that the employer did not discover in the ordinary course of business, but
that was unearthed during a search of the employee's record or background that
was inspired by, and designed as a response to, the employee's discrimination
allegations. '
This language appears to interject that the employer should establish
that it would have discovered the evidence without the lawsuit. Thereaf-
ter, the U.S. and EEOC Brief asserts that, if the trial court, upon remand,
407. See Revised Enforcement Guide, supra note 404, at 405: 6926; supra notes 301-
18 and accompanying text discussing Kristufek; see also Zemelman, supra note 24, at
204. Where the discovery date is not known, the EEOC recommends reducing dam-
ages "based upon an assessment of the approximate date of discovery." Revised En-
forcement Guide, supra note 404, at 6926 n.27; see also Babb, supra note 30, at 1963
& n.148.
408. See EEOC Office of General Counsel, Revised EEOC General Counsel's Memo
on Civil Rights Act of 1991, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) F-1 (Mar. 4, 1993).
409. See Babb, supra note 30, at 1970; Follette, supra note 33, at 663.
410. See U.S. & EEOC Brief, supra note 43, at D-8 (citing Kristufek v. Hussman
Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993)).
411. U.S. & EEOC Brief, supra note 43, at D-8 n.17 (requiring employer to prove
that it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence in the absence of the alleg-
edly unlawful acts and the litigation, in order to cut-off backpay) (citing Wallace v.
Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th
Cir. 1994), rev'd in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995)).
412. U.S. & EEOC Brief, supra note 43, at D-8.
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finds that McKennon's discharge was discriminatory, "but that she there-
after would have been lawfully discharged based on after-acquired evi-
dence, the court would then have discretion to deny reinstatement and
terminate backpay as of the date the discharge would have occurred
absent discrimination." ' This latter recommendation carefully avoids
the issue of how the after-acquired evidence came to light. Overall, the
recommendation of the Justice Department and the EEOC in its
McKennon brief regarding the cut-off of backpay is confusing. It strad-
dles the 1992 Revised Enforcement Guidance, but peers wistfully at the
make-whole relief envisaged in Albemarle and Wallace."4
The EEOC's recommendations on the use of after-acquired evidence
generally have not had a great impact on the judicial outcomes, and the
agency's guidance in this area has been criticized by some commenta-
tors.41 In particular, the entitlement to compensatory damages under
the 1991 amendments to Title VII arguably should not be terminated as
of the date of discovery of the after-acquired evidence, as the EEOC Re-
vised Enforcement Guidelines apparently advocate."' While the EEOC's
position should be taken into account by the federal district courts,
which are vested with the authority to order remedies in these cases, the
Supreme Court's guidance from McKennon should provide the principal
direction."7
413. Id. at D-9.
414. Id. at D-8 & n.17 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975); Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182)).
415. Compare Steele, supra note 406, at 274; Zemelman, supra note 24, at 204-06
(criticizing EEOC) with Follette, supra note 25, at 663, 667, 670 (recommending de-
ferral to EEOC Guidance); R. Shaw Wellons, Plaintiffs Bane: The After-Acquired
Evidence Defense and Title VII Discrimination Suits, 29 WAKE FoRFSr L REV. 1325,
1354-55 (1994) (urging Supreme Court to adopt EEOC position); Mills, supra note 24,
at 1551-57 (generally recommending EEOC Guidelines but pointing out some defects).
416. Mills, supra note 24, at 1553; see also Zemelman, supra note 24, at 206.
"([Plersonal injuries" including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
and loss of enjoyment of life "do not cease on the date an employer discovers after-
acquired evidence." Zemelman, supra note 17, at 206. In addition to the previously
available remedies of reinstatement, backpay, front pay, injunctive relief, prejudgment
interest and attorney's fees, the 1991 Civil Rights Act added the availability of com-
pensatory and punitive damages with caps based upon the size of the employer. See
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2)(3) (Supp. 1H1 1991). For a concise summary of the damages
available pursuant to the 1991 amendments, see Parker, supra note 24, at 425-26 &
nn.137-41.
417. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886-87 (1995).
C. Supreme Court Guidance
The McKennon Court specifically noted that it could not "require the
employer to ignore the [after-acquired] information... even if the infor-
mation might have gone undiscovered absent the suit."4"8 However, the
Court prefaced its discussion by referencing the interests and equities
that must be balanced in determining the proper measure of backpay.
41 9
The language that "Itihe beginning point in the trial court's formula-
tion of a remedy should be calculation of backpay from the date of the
unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered,"420
might be interpreted to encourage the trial courts to award backpay
beyond that point in instances where it is warranted. This construction is
reinforced by the next sentence of the opinion, which sets forth that "the
court can consider taking into further account [in determining the ap-
propriate relief] extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the
legitimate interests of either party."42" ' Certainly the Court anticipated
that the trial courts would exercise their discretion based upon their
evaluation of the facts and equities in each case."
D. Analysis and Recommendations
Once liability for employment discrimination is ascertained, the em-
ployer may use after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing to estab-
lish that, if it had known of the wrongdoing, it would have terminated
the employee on those grounds alone.' If the employer is successful at
that stage, the remedies of reinstatement and front pay will be unavail-
able,"' but backpay need not be curtailed as of the discovery date of
the after-acquired evidence in every case. This is so because such a rule
would reward the employer for its wrongdoing where the evidence
would not have been discovered absent the discrimination lawsuit. The
egregiousness of the wrongdoing and its nexus to the plaintiffs employ-
ment and to the discrimination must be considered, as well as the harm
suffered by the employer as a result of the wrongdoing.
In the McKennon case, arguably, an exemplary employee of nearly four
decades would hardly have violated confidentiality if she had not been a
victim of the defendant's discrimination. While the courts should be
418. Id. at 886; see supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text discussing fully re-
medial guidance from McKennon.
419. McKennon, 115 S. Ct at 886.
420. Id. (emphasis added).
421. Id.
422. See id.
423. See id. at 886-87.
424. See id. at 886.
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loathe to overlook employee breaches of duty, they should also weigh
the harm to the employer resulting from the plaintiff's breach of duty. In
McKennon, the harm to the employer was de minimis. As was noted ear-
lier, Justice Stevens reportedly reflected at the close of oral arguments in
the case, "[t]he result is a severe one for McKelmon but did not cause
even a nickel of damages for the Banner. At worst, she told a corporate
secret to her husband."4" Of course, the courts should be mindful that
their resolution of the two wrongs in these cases will ultimately impact
upon the future conduct of both employers and employees.
It is unlikely that the Banner would have discovered McKennon's
wrongdoing absent the lawsuit. Thus, but for the discrimination, she
would not have been discharged. This is the premise upon which Wallace
and Mardell required the employer to establish that the after-acquired
evidence would have been discovered anyway, absent the lawsuit, in
order to curtail backpay prior to the date of judgment.426 This rule more
nearly places the victim of discrimination in the place that he or she
would have been in absent the discrimination,427 rather than using the
actual date of discovery of the information."'
Certainly, the use of the actual date of discovery is a more convenient
rule than the "would have been discovered anyway" rule. However, con-
425. Justices Debate, supra note 12, at AA-3; see also supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text.
426. See supra notes 280-300 and 319-57 and accompanying text for discussion of
these cases. The McKennon case is distinguishable from the facts in Wallace and
MardeUi which both involved application fraud. As Judge Godbold noted in his dissent
in the Wallace case, such false application claims should be categorized and treated
differently from those involving mere employee wrongdoing in a rightfully obtained
position. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 1992). The
Eleventh Circuit's subsequent en banc decision made clear that the same logic applies
to both classes of cases. Wallace, 63 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, both
groups of employees who are "guilty of undiscovered misconduct work on borrowed
time," as one commentator aptly phrased the situation. Wellons, supra note 415, at
1355.
427. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975).
428. The use of the actual date of discovery may be appropriate in some cases,
e.g., where the employee's wrongdoing is egregious in nature or extent. Although the
NLRB used this standard in John Cuneo, Inc., 298 NLRB Dec. (CCK) 16, 123
(1990), the facts in that case involved serious employee wrongdoing, a willful, deliber-
ate, and intentional misstatement of employment history that resulted in a hiring that
would not otherwise have occurred. The Board there sought to avoid an "undue
windfall" to either side. Id For another discussion of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine, see. Kenneth R Davis, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine: A Dubious
Defense in Employment Discrimination Cases, 22 PEPP. L REv. 365 (1995).
venience is not the sole concern where important statutory rights have
been violated. Placing a burden of proof on the employer on this issue
sends a message that discrimination is not lightly tolerated, and that a
defendant's wrongdoing will not inadvertently bear fruit by allowing the
after-acquired evidence from pre-trial discovery to automatically cut off
the accrual of backpay. An outcast employee is often the proverbial Da-
vid seeking retribution against a Goliath with far greater financial and
legal resources to combat litigation. The remedy should fit the injuries in
these cases and neither party should be entitled to escape the conse-
quences of misconduct.
IX. CONCLUSION
The purposes and policies behind the federal labor and employment
laws include balancing the inequalities between employers and the em-
ployed, as well as the inequalities between the employees themselves.
These purposes are well served when plaintiffs come forward to process
legitimate complaints of statutory violations and are rewarded for telling
the whole truth. The after-acquired evidence doctrine, promulgated in the
Summers case, and adopted by a majority of the federal circuit courts of
appeals, permitted after-acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing to
bar liability for defendant employers in employment discrimination cases
where the after-acquired nondiscriminatory reason for termination would
have independently resulted in discharge.
The United States Supreme Court in McKennon clarified that after-
acquired evidence may not establish a legitimate "reason" for a termina-
tion that will bar liability for employment discrimination. After-acquired
evidence, lacking temporal propinquity to the decision, could not have
even partially motivated the decision, and thus these cases may not be
analyzed as mixed-motive cases. If the employer who is found liable for
employment discrimination proves that the after-acquired grounds for
termination alone would have resulted in discharge, then reinstatement
and front pay will not be available as remedies. Backpay may terminate
as of the discovery date of the after-acquired evidence that provided the
employer with an independent, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.
Where the facts and equities dictate, backpay may extend to the date
when the after-acquired information would have been discovered anyway
(absent the lawsuit) or to the date of judgment. Other compensatory and
punitive damages,4" attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest may also
be awarded. The trial courts are vested with discretion to balance the
interests and equities of the parties once the facts are determined.
429. Under Title VII compensatory and punitive damages are available for causes of
action occurring after 1991. See supra note 416.
